Standing Committee B

[Janet Anderson in the Chair]

Identity Cards Bill

Clause 12 - Notification of changes affecting accuracy of Register

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 132, in clause 12, page 10, line 32, at end insert
'(1A) For the purposes of ensuring that an individual is able to comply with his duty under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must at least once every two years send in a prescribed manner to each individual to whom an ID card has been issued at his prescribed address a copy of the information recorded as at a prescribed date about that individual in the Register.'. 
I welcome you to the Chair, Ms Anderson. Having glided effortlessly through clauses 9, 10 and 11 prior to our break, we now come to clause 12. It deals with maintaining the accuracy of the register, which will be achieved mainly through obligations on individuals to notify changes in relevant information. However, it does not create an obligation to audit the information contained on the register. The Government's record on the accuracy of information that is held on databases is mixed. That was made clear recently by the Criminal Records Bureau, which was shown to hold numerous inaccurate details of convictions. 
While inaccurate information in the Criminal Records Bureau can be discovered through the issuing of a criminal conviction certificate, inaccuracies on the national identity register can remain undetected indefinitely. As well as there being obligations on individuals, which is understood and accepted, is it not arguable that we should try everything possible to ensure that entries are accurate and, furthermore, that such a stipulation should be written into the Bill? One way in which to achieve that would be to require details of the entry to be sent biannually to those on the register, so that such details can be checked. 
The register should be as accurate as possible. Self-verification is the best way in which to ensure that. The Government may argue that such a procedure would cost a lot of money. However, much money will be spent on setting up the register, and it must be worth incurring a little extra expense to ensure that the information contained in it is accurate. Everything that we can do to help towards that end should be done, hence probing amendment No. 132.

Patrick Mercer: I welcome you back to the Chair, Ms Anderson. The addition that we would make to the Bill is simple. I hark back to an earlier debate in which the Minister seemed interested. The Australians have changed their identity card regulations by introducing a system of self-regulation whereby every so often—I am not sure about the time  limit—the details of what is contained on their national register and identity cards are sent to the individuals for them to say that they are correct or that changes have occurred.
An Army identity card follows that precise pattern. Whatever qualifications or circumstances have changed for the individuals, their personal records—some of which are on the identity card—are sent to them every two years for them to update. Only by so doing are the records and cards kept straight. The two parallels are useful: first, that the Australians have thought it worth while to introduce such a requirement and, secondly, that other identity card schemes—albeit not national identity cards—have parallels. Such a requirement would be useful and cost-effective.

John Taylor: I add my support to that of my hon. Friends the Members for Woking (Mr. Malins) and for Newark (Patrick Mercer) for amendment No. 132. I wish to draw a little homespun analogy with which all Members of Parliament will be familiar: once each year, we are sent copies of our entries in the Register of Members' Interests and asked to check and satisfy ourselves that they are still correct and then return them to the registrar.
The amendment is a commendable proposal. It lends itself to continuing accuracy in the record, and, in an indirect but perfectly healthy way, to keeping the registered and the registrar in dialogue with each other. That would be helpful.

Des Browne: May I add my welcome to those of other hon. Members to you, Ms Anderson? I am grateful for this opportunity to concentrate briefly on the issue of the accuracy of the register, which is at the heart of the whole scheme.
The Government are mindful that all practicable steps ought to be taken to ensure that data are entirely accurate, and that those to whom they relate are notified of information in that regard, where it is practical to do so. That would do nothing more than make us conform with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998, which was partly enacted for this very purpose. I want to say where the basis of that accuracy will lie, and how it will be achieved. 
In passing, I point out to the hon. Member for Newark that the Australians do not have an identity scheme; he is probably aware of that. For all I know, he may be right about the practices he mentioned to the Committee, but they might relate to the social security card scheme that the Australians have, rather than any identity card. However, that does not detract from his point. 
If this scheme is to provide the standard of identification that we need, it is vital that the applicant's identity is verified in the first instance, before an entry is made in the register. Clause 11 enables us to do that, by virtue of checks and other sources of information. A Cabinet Office study on identity fraud published in July 2002 recommended greater use of biographical checks on applicants to prevent identity fraud; that is why the clause has been drafted in this way. 
The national identity register will be a new database, and applications will require checks to be made against other databases, such as Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency driver information, Department for Work and Pensions information on national insurance, and birth, marriage and death records, in order to establish a biographical footprint, and to protect against fraudulent applications, among other things. That information will give us a basis from which the register can go forward. It will be verified at that early point, and it will reach the highest possible standards. 
The amendment would require the Secretary of State to send to each individual to whom an identity card has been issued a copy of the details recorded in his entry on the register every two years. Some countries—the Netherlands, for example—do that in their identity card scheme; a statement is delivered to the individual's recorded home address. We considered doing that, but we have rejected it for security reasons and to ensure that personal information is available only to the person to whom that information relates. We do not consider that it would be an appropriate way of ensuring that an individual is aware of the information recorded in his entry. 
However, that does not mean that an individual will not be aware of his or her entry. All applicants will have data subject access rights under the 1998 Act, and we are looking at ways of ensuring that an individual will be able to read his or her card and the register entry as easily as possible. For example, we might be able to offer a service whereby an individual could read the information held on his or her entry securely via the internet or public service kiosks. 
I hope that what I have said reassures hon. Members that we will be able to maintain security from the base of having the highest security standards from the outset, and that they will agree that the amendment is unnecessary.

Humfrey Malins: We are all grateful to the Minister for his response. We are united in wishing that the register remains accurate. We thought that this amendment might be a useful addition, but we do not feel strongly enough to press it to a Division. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 117, in clause 12, page 11, line 10, after 'who', insert 'intentionally'.

Janet Anderson: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 100, in clause 12, page 11, line 11, leave out '£1000' and add '£50'.

Humfrey Malins: It is well to observe that we are dealing with the duties on individuals to notify the Secretary of State about changes of circumstances. Failure to do so involves a civil penalty of up to £1,000. The Minister will be the first to recognise that other clauses mention a number of actions, or failures to act, that could be very serious in terms of moral culpability. For example, in due course we will move on to clauses relating to having in one's possession apparatus for the purposes of forgery. That is serious and, in the minds  of all normal people, seriously criminal. However, under this clause we are dealing with a slightly different position; we are dealing with the individual who is forgetful.
Many of us can be forgetful, hence amendment No. 117, which would make the provision read: ''An individual who intentionally contravenes a requirement . . . under this section shall be liable to a civil penalty''; that would replace the strict liability that exists at the moment.

John Taylor: If my hon. Friend is successful in persuading the Committee of the merits of amendment No. 117, and the offence becomes one of intentionally contravening, that would be a tougher test, but a more serious offence. If he succeeds, therefore, with amendment No. 117, will he desist with amendment No. 100? Having made the offence more serious, might he not wish to leave in place the higher penalty for committing the more serious offence of contravening of the requirement of the statute?

Humfrey Malins: My hon. Friend asks me for my views on amendment No. 100, but I would like to hear the arguments put forward on it before I give my opinion. However, I am grateful to him for his intervention.
The problem is the person who is rather negligent; I am a bit worried that such people will be punished quite heavily. I will tell the Minister of an interesting little parallel that I was thinking about, relating to the duty on each of us to supply the DVLA with details of changes of address and so on. The Minister cannot answer my next point, and nor can those advising him, because it is very much a matter for the Department for Transport, but it is a fair parallel. It would be interesting to know how many names and addresses of vehicle-keepers and licence holders appear on the DVLA database and—here is the rub—I wonder whether any of us could estimate how many of those addresses are not up-to-date. I venture to suggest from my own experience that the answer must be millions. Also, it would be interesting to find out how many people have been prosecuted for failure to keep their addresses up-to-date in the past few years. I say that to illustrate the difficulty that we could be in.

Des Browne: The hon. Gentleman and I are like-minded on this subject. I had inquiries made because I was aware—as is he, from his experience on the bench—of the requirement to update one's address for the DVLA under pain of committing a criminal offence. That is for obvious reasons; it is because of the consequences for other road users if people drive around with incorrect information on their driving licence. Unfortunately, the statistical evidence on that is collected under a database field, as it is known, that includes information on a number of comparatively minor road traffic offences, and it was not possible to disaggregate the information. It is axiomatic that there is no way that I, or anyone, would know how many wrong addresses were on the database.

Humfrey Malins: That is a fair point. However, it would be interesting if each Committee member who had moved in the past year or two—I have not—could ask themselves whether their particulars with the DVLA  are accurate. I am sure that the Minister will agree that there is an issue here and in all probability—although who can say?—the accuracy of the DVLA database in terms of constant changes of address is open to question. If that is right, we will have a problem, which is why I ask whether clause 12(6) should say ''intentionally''. It would be helpful if the Minister commented on the Secretary of State's likely approach when he comes to impose a civil penalty in relation to this sort of thing, compared with the other, much more serious, matters in the Bill relating to criminal offences.
That is the spirit in which I speak to the amendment.

Des Browne: This is an echo of our debate on civil penalties in clause 6, although on that occasion we were discussing an amendment that endeavoured to introduce the phrase, ''without reasonable excuse'', rather than one using the word ''intentionally''. However, amendment No. 117 essentially opens up the same debate—if I am not doing a disservice to it.
I concede, as I did in that debate, that there is an issue here and I understand that hon. Members wish to make liability to a civil penalty under the clause dependant on intention. Intention, however, may be difficult to prove and may generate a burdensome administrative process in the context of a scheme like this. Indeed, the Government take that view because the civil penalties under the clause may be serious in relation to certain individuals and there could be serious consequences relating to a failure to keep details in the register up to date. Consequently, I appreciate why hon. Members wish to write a fault element into the clause. However, for the reasons I gave last week in the debate on clause 6, that is not necessary. 
I reiterate that because the Secretary of State is not under an obligation to impose a penalty when a requirement is contravened he intends to exercise his discretion to consider reasonable excuses, and explanations that a contravention was unintentional, if he is aware of them at the time of imposing the penalty. I think that I will be able to give hon. Members further reassurance.

John Taylor: I defer to the Minister, whom I have always admired, not least as a lawyer; he is rather a good one and there are no penalties on me for admiring his skill as a lawyer. However, I hope that he takes note of this point in passing that the concept of intention is not unknown to English law. I cannot comment on Scottish law. Intention is at the core of stealing, for example, where there has to be an intention to deprive the rightful owner of whatever is stolen. The English courts have managed to get their mind round that concept for many years. I hope that the Minister is not suggesting that intention as a concept is a barrier to proceeding with the amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking.

Des Browne: I accept with good grace the hon. Gentleman's view of my abilities as a lawyer, although I have not practised for some years. If I ever go back  and practise, I will look for instructions—if the hon. Gentleman needs a lawyer and if he can afford me.
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. Intention is not unknown to Scots law either. There is a great commonality between Scots and English law and we have learned and borrowed from each other ever since 1707, and before then, to our mutual benefit. However, my substantive response to that point will have to wait until we debate clause 34, which provides for people being able to object to civil penalties. 
Government amendments Nos. 189 to 193, which have now been tabled, provide that one of the grounds on which a person may challenge a penalty is that the circumstances of the contravention in respect of which he is liable makes the imposition of the penalty unreasonable. Under that provision, a person who has unintentionally contravened could object to a penalty. The Government amendments have been drafted in response to the undertakings that I gave following the debate that we had on clause 6. 
From a practical point of view, it would simply not be feasible for the Secretary of State to have to satisfy himself that each contravention was intentional before imposing a civil penalty. Last week, the hon. Member for Woking raised the issue of article 6. I recognise that it applies to the penalty regime but, as I pointed out then and repeat today, if a decision determined to involve a person's civil obligations is taken by the Executive, there will be no violation of article 6, provided that there is a right to challenge the decision before a judicial body with full jurisdiction providing the guarantees of article 6. That has been provided for in turn in clause 35. 
I put forward that argument in relation to amendment No. 117 and I hope that it is persuasive, as it was in relation to the issue of ''without reasonable excuse'' and clause 6. 
I will quickly turn to the maximum penalty that might be imposed under clause 12. Amendment No. 100 seeks to reduce that to £50. I do not want to get into the debate that was developing in the exchange between Opposition Members. However, the maximum penalty of £1,000 reflects the importance of the register being kept up to date. There will be discretion about the amount of the penalty to be imposed. Clause 36 provides for a code of practice setting out the matters to be considered when determining the amount to be imposed in any case. I have already reassured the Committee that part of the determination of that figure will include an inquiry as to the financial circumstances of the individual, so that the penalty is proportionate to the person's circumstances. 
A maximum penalty of £50 would send out entirely the wrong message. It would encourage people not to register and we should view the penalties as a warning to individuals. I hope that they will never need to be imposed, but the intention is that they will encourage conformity. I hope that the Committee agrees that the penalty has been set at the right maximum level and that in the light of the Government's amendments Nos. 189 to 193, which are now published, it is not  necessary to make liability to those penalties subject to intention.

Humfrey Malins: I am grateful to the Minister and I think he responded very reasonably.
My hon. Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. Taylor) quite rightly flagged up the issue of the relevance of intent in law and he referred to theft. That got my mind moving to a debate that we nearly had this morning. Under clause 8, the ID card remains the property of the person issuing it, which I take to mean the Secretary of State. Therefore, I imagine every indictment of theft of a card in the Crown Court would name the Secretary of State as the owner. Defendants who pleaded not guilty—and I imagine everyone would, just for a good joke—would require the attendance of the Secretary of State to give evidence that it actually was his. That is a debate for an earlier moment and I do not expect the Minister to say a single word about it. 
The Minister is sympathetic and in later clauses we will come to concessions from the Government. When he says, as he has done, that a code of practice and an issue of discretion is involved, we feel more comforted. He knows what we want to avoid and he has gone part way to reassuring us. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mark Oaten: I beg to move amendment No. 101, in clause 12, page 11, line 11, at end add—
'(7) The Secretary of State shall make no charge for changes to the Register required by this section.'. 
It is a pleasure to be a member of the Committee and to be serving under your chairmanship, Ms Anderson. I do not intend to detain the Committee for long. 
The purpose of tabling the amendment is to establish a couple of issues about the clause and the way in which the notification of any changes affecting the accuracy of the register would take place. I have some simple questions for the Minister. Will there be any impact on the costs involved for individuals who comply? In other words, are any charges planned as part of a notification where someone has to submit a change of address or name? However, would any charge be incurred for notifying the register of changes? 
Secondly, I should like to get a sense of the Minister's estimate of how many annual changes are likely to be required under the clause. What are we looking at? What kind of roll change will there be, and how many individuals will have to notify the register of changes? I am assuming that we are dealing in this clause with people who change their names or move house and that an individual would have to notify for those two main reasons. 
I have looked at the electoral roll, as many Members are suddenly doing with greater interest at the moment, and I noticed a churn in my constituency. In parts of London, that churn can involve up to a quarter of the population. Many people move or get married each year. It would be interesting to know the  Government's estimate of how many individuals will need to make a change to the register. How do the Government think that number can be managed and coped with on top of those individuals coming on stream—on to the register and having ID cards—day to day anyway? 
Those are my questions: will there be any costs and charges involved for individuals and what will the churn effect be? How many notifications and changes will have to take place? I hope that the Minister can answer that latter point, which is significant for the ability of the system to operate effectively.

John Taylor: I ought to offer an apology to the hon. Gentleman for my unintentional inadvertence. I asked my hon. Friend the Member for Woking whether he would comment on the interaction between amendments Nos. 117 and 100. At that moment, I had not realised the authorship of amendment No. 100. Perhaps it would have been more courteous for me to have addressed my comments to the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten).
I content myself by saying the following, as a modest contribution to the very real concept of churn. Every year in this country, we issue 1 million new driving licences that did not exist before. The numerical changes can be very substantial indeed.

Des Browne: I am grateful for the brevity with which the hon. Member for Winchester introduced his amendment. I shall try to reflect that same brevity in my response. I understand the wishes behind this amendment, which would provide that no charges would be levied for modifications to the register.
Our intention is that when details are changed in the register and no new card is issued, there should be no charge to the individual. However, it is right that the maintenance processes should ensure that payment could be collected, in particular in cases when a new card needs to be issued. Any charging scheme is still to be finalised, and the actual charges will depend on the circumstances in which any notification relevant to an individual's entry needs to be made. 
It is not uncommon for charges to be made in such circumstances. For example, the DVLA levy a charge for the replacement of a lost driving licence and the Passport Service does the same for lost or stolen passports, except in exceptional circumstances. I reassure Committee members, for the sake of their constituents and others, that we agreed with great alacrity not to levy any charge on those who lost their passports in that tragic event, the tsunami. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Winchester raises his eyebrows from a sedentary position.

Chris Mole: That is quite a trick.

Des Browne: Perhaps the Official Report should put, ''From his sedentary position, he raises his eyebrows.'' I personally assure the hon. Member for Winchester—I am sure that he will take this from me—that immediately that the issue was brought to my attention, I decided that no charges should be levied and issued an instruction to that effect. If I was remiss  at all, it was in not anticipating for a couple of days that that would be an issue.
Some official who took a phone call from a distressed relative or individual may have been unable to develop the policy at that point. That is no criticism of the official. Once brought to my attention—by one of my hon. Friends, in a short conversation—I immediately took the decision that we would not be allowing a charge. The decision was not a difficult one and I am not looking for credit, but it was made as quickly as it could have been. Members will understand that a number of decisions had to be made around Government very quickly about that time. If there was any inconvenience to any constituents, I apologise to them for those few days in which perhaps the decision had not been made. 
This is quite common. The hon. Member for Winchester seeks a specific answer to another question. I deeply regret that I am unable to answer that question. At this stage of the development of the scheme, we have not yet decided exactly what changes will be notifiable or how notifications are to be made. As that decision has not been made, I cannot tell him how many notifications we estimate will need to be made. He can rest assured that there will be a substantial number of them. From our own experience of constituents moving, as reflected in the voters register, he is quite right that there are significant changes. I recollect from my period of responsibility for that area of policy in Northern Ireland, in some places up to a quarter of people can change their address in an electoral registration area in a Parliament.

David Curry: It is quite common that when professional ladies get married they maintain their maiden name for the purposes of continuing work, but adopt their married name in a more social environment. When somebody is quite legitimately operating under two surnames, what would be the position on identity cards?

Des Browne: This is off the top of my head and, if I am inaccurate, I will communicate with the Committee as I have done over the past 24 hours, but my understanding of the scheme is that people will be able to register under any particular identity. If for legitimate, not fraudulent, reasons they wish to use another name, then that fact could be registered and recorded on the register. We will not be issuing two cards to anyone. People will have to decide for the card. That is my immediate response. I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman. [Interruption.] As I stand here, inspiration arrives—in my head. Interestingly, what I have been given is what I just told the Committee. Both names will have to be registered, but individuals can choose which of the names goes on the card. It will be a matter of choice for the individual.
I do not think that I have anything to add. I have made myself clear to the hon. Member for Winchester.  He will express a degree of dissatisfaction—I expect that—probably merited given his view of the scheme.

Mark Oaten: I am extremely grateful for the Minister's comments on passports for those involved in the tsunami tragedy. Someone did contact me and I raised those concerns with the Home Office, which responded in that way, for which the whole Committee will be grateful.
I take some comfort from the response of the Minister on the charges that could not be imposed on an individual who has to notify a change on the register. However, the Committee will note that he did not rule out the possibility that there could be some admin charges involved in that process. He has not categorically said that there would be no charges. 
If we take the figure from this morning—a family of two adults and two teenage children—we are looking at an initial cost of about £500 to put the scheme in place. If, after they have registered and got their cards, six months later they choose to move house, they will be interested to know whether there will be charges involved as a consequence. That could be a considerable figure, particularly on that scale—four individuals in an adult household. 
We may want to revisit that point. I am useless at false outrage, but having got this far into the Bill, I am outraged that the Minister does not yet know the churn effect. The Government are working on how the scheme will operate, so they should know how many additional individuals will need to make changes during the year, because that will be significant. That strikes me as odd, and I am mildly flabbergasted that they do not have the figures.

Des Browne: The hon. Gentleman may be flabbergasted, but I may have misinterpreted his question. I thought that he was asking for specific figures. If he wanted to know the rate, I can tell him that we are operating on a churn rate of addresses of 14 per cent. per annum and a churn rate of names of 0.5 per cent. per annum.

Mark Oaten: No, I wanted to know whether the Government have made an estimate of the impact. I am surprised that the name change figure is as low as it is, but obviously the Home Office has carried out research on that. I am also slightly surprised that the churn rate of individuals moving addresses is only 14 per cent. That does not ring true compared with the electoral roll. However, at least it was helpful to receive the figures. I hope that we will have the reassurance that, when the Government are examining the implementation of the provision, they will have factored all that into account.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Before the hon. Gentleman concludes, will he press the Minister on whether the figure of 5 per cent. for name changes includes divorcees? I imagine that, during a year, quite a number of divorcees will want to change their names.

Mark Oaten: It would be helpful for the Minister to drop us a useful note about that setting out exactly what percentage of people and how many individuals it is thought will be involved in house change,  including the impact on the figures of those individuals who change their name through marriage or who have gone through divorce process.
While I am on my feet, we want to know about the cost of having to notify debts. How will the system cope with such issues? We need a note that explains the churn plus effect. Subject to having that information on the record and to the reassurance that we have received that it is not the Government's intention to charge automatically for changes to the register, I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13 - Invalidity and surrender of ID cards

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 45, in clause 13, page 11, line 14, leave out from 'State' to 'if'.

Janet Anderson: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 46, in clause 13, page 12, line 6, after 'who', insert 'unreasonably'.
No. 102, in clause 13, page 12, line 7, leave out paragraph (a).

Humfrey Malins: We are dealing with the subject of notifying the Secretary of State about cards that have gone absent. Let us suppose that each member of the Committee puts up their hands in response to a question about whether they have ever sent their clothing to the dry cleaners with either a card or a £5 note in the pocket and have never seen it again? If that has not happened to anyone here, I would be absolutely amazed. It happens in my family the whole time.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I wish to tell my hon. Friend an interesting little story that happened to a constituent the other day. He had put £250 in cash into the pocket of his trousers. He gave the trousers to Oxfam. Perhaps it was another charity—I would not like to besmirch the name of Oxfam. Anyway, when he went back to the shop the next day to get the £250 back, they would not give it to him because they thought that it was a gift.

Humfrey Malins: There we are. That is a most interesting story. I imagine that the constituent probably had to buy back the trousers.
When I first read the clause, I thought that the words ''damaged'' or ''tampered with'' were slightly different concepts for people to understand. Clause 13(1) obliges us to report to the Secretary of State if our 
''card has been—
(a) lost;
(b) stolen;
(c) damaged;
(d) tampered with; or
(e) destroyed.''
I might get slightly fraught with worry if I could not find my identity card on a Friday evening. I might ask myself whether I should notify the Home Secretary the following morning, or wait until Wednesday on the  off-chance that it turns up—in the dry cleaning, for instance. 
Amendment No. 45 is intended to draw from the Minister an explanation of why I have 
''to notify the Secretary of State, and such other persons as may be prescribed''.
I have searched the explanatory notes for guidance on who those other persons are. Perhaps it is stated somewhere in the Bill. I am concerned at the prospect of having to notify not only the Secretary of State of the problem of my card being mislaid or lost, but a lot of other people. I do not know who those people are, and I am hoping that the Minister will tell us. That is the purpose of this probing amendment. 
Amendment No. 46 addresses this reference in subsection (6): 
''A person who contravenes a requirement''.
I want to insert the word ''unreasonably''. I believe that the Home Affairs Committee thought that a reasonableness defence should be included in the Bill. If that is the case, there may be an argument for including it. 
There is a further brief matter that I want to address, but I would prefer it to be discussed in the clause stand part debate.

Mark Oaten: I rise to support the points made by the hon. Gentleman on this issue, and I want to raise a further couple of points by way of amendment No. 102. They relate to the periods of time within which individuals would have to realise that they had lost an identity card.
The hon. Gentleman asked how many times people had lost a £5 note at a dry cleaners. Surely, the answer to that is that most of us do not know whether that has happened to us. There is a real issue about when people discover when they have lost something. There must have been quite a few things that I have lost but that I did not even know that I had lost. On such occasions, when it was pointed out to me that I had lost it, I could innocently have said that I had no idea. Somebody could then turn to me and say, ''Well, that is odd, because you probably lost it six months ago and you haven't used it since.'' That might make me feel slightly guilty because I had not reported losing something, even though I genuinely did not know that it was lost. 
Somebody may claim that they lost their card ages ago—for example, if they suddenly realise that it must have been lost when their car was stolen eight months ago. Can the Minister assure us that any action taken would be reasonable, and that there would not be an automatic assumption that the loss had to be reported within 24 or 48 hours, or within similar parameters? 
Does the Minister have any comments to make on whether an individual will be required to prove that they have lost the document, and what evidence they might be required to produce to prove that? Sometimes people have to go through quite a process to show that a document has been registered lost, or that they have told the police that it was lost, in order to prove that they are not making things up and they genuinely have lost the document. Does the Minister  wish to tell us anything about that issue? Will individuals have to prove that they have lost this document? 
The clause contains a provision that people may have to bring their old card when they seek to renew. Why is that provision included? Is it to ensure that there are no old cards in the system because people have to hand back their cards? Will it be a requirement on all occasions that people have to hand back their old card when they seek to renew a card? We are concerned that we might be being a little heavy handed with individuals who have genuinely lost their card. 
Finally, what is the definition of damage to a card? It would be helpful to understand that, because someone walking around with a card that is slightly bent or twisted might discover that when they put it through a reader to access health services—if that ends up being a use for the card—it does not work. Whose fault is it that the card was damaged? Should the person have notified someone to say that it was damaged? How on earth does one know whether it is damaged? Those are just a few issues on which we would like clarification.

Patrick Mercer: I want briefly to speak on amendment No. 45. The Bill reads:
''Regulations may require an individual to whom an ID card has been issued to notify the Secretary of State, and such other persons as may be prescribed''.
My hon. Friend the Member for Woking has already made this point, but in the case of a lost passport, the onus is on the owner to notify merely one authority. Why has the provision that I read out been included? If the Minister insists on keeping it in the Bill, would he be kind enough to tell us precisely which other authorities must be informed? As the hon. Member for Winchester points out, a list is given. The provision mentions cards that are 
''(a) lost;
(b) stolen;
(c) damaged;
(d) tampered with; or
(e) destroyed''.
Some of those terms may require further definition.

Des Browne: The hon. Members who seek further definition have put their fingers on a reasonable point, and that is exactly why there are definitions of both phrases in subsection (8). It is reasonable to give people some point of reference on what ''damaged'' or ''tampered with'' means in relation to a card. We have put that guidance in the Bill itself, so that people will have that point of reference.
The whole idea of knowledge is written quite specifically into the provisions, although it was not in the draft Bill. That is one of the changes made as a result of the Home Affairs Committee's pre-legislative scrutiny of this Bill and others. It made the sensible recommendation that subsection (1) should apply only if someone 
''knows or has reason to suspect that the card has been''
lost, stolen, damaged, tampered with or destroyed. The change was made directly in response to the Select Committee's argument. 
The Government have taken upon themselves the responsibility to provide evidence from which knowledge can be inferred. It certainly would not be helpful to set out in the Bill what 
''knows or has reason to suspect''
means, because it is quite a common phrase in legislation; it has been well exercised in the courts and there are a number of definitions, but it is a function of evidence. The Government have taken it upon themselves to ensure that that is the standard that they have to meet. 
It is, of course, standard practice when renewing a passport to surrender the expiring document so that it can be invalidated in some way. I do not think that it is unreasonable to require people with valuable documents to take on a responsibility to notify the issuing authority if they are lost, stolen, damaged, tampered with or destroyed, and I do not think that anyone is suggesting that it is unreasonable. 
Amendment No. 45 would remove the power to require an individual to report that a card has been lost, stolen, damaged, tampered with or destroyed to anyone other than the Secretary of State. Not unreasonably, hon. Members ask why anyone beyond the Secretary of State should be informed, as the Secretary of State is the issuing authority for the identity card. The answer lies in the fact that if, under clause 4, a document is designated that would, in the normal run of events, not be issued by the Secretary of State—and that is possible; say we choose at some point to designate a driving licence—a document notification that the card has been lost, stolen et cetera would be of relevance to the issuing authority. If that were restricted only to the Secretary of State, he would, in order to ensure the integrity of the designated document scheme to which the ID card was related, have to notify the designated documents authority of the report of laws, thereby adding an extra step to the Secretary of State's processes and putting no obligation on the individual. That is not to say that there will not, in the fullness of time, be a process within government that will allow such an exchange of information to take place. It is sensible that if we are allying these documents, and the loss of one could potentially effect the integrity of another, there ought to be some obligation on the individuals to recognise that relationship. The person who the individual may notify would be subject to parliamentary approval through the regulations made under clause 13(1), so Parliament will have an opportunity to consider that. 
Amendment No. 46 would add the word ''unreasonably'' to clause 13(6), so: 
''A person who contravenes a requirement''
to notify loss or fails to surrender a card 
''is guilty of an offence.''
Following the recommendations of the Home Affairs Committee, we have already added to clause 13(1)  wording relating to a failure to notify losses, subject to the test that the individual 
''knows or has reason to suspect'',
so the issue of reason has already been written in and we do not need to deal twice with the card being lost. That is sufficient and we do not need to go further. 
Similarly, the offence of failing to surrender the card applies only if the person is in possession of an ID card to which he is not entitled and fails to surrender it as soon as is practicable, or where the Secretary of State specifically requires that individual to surrender it. That is appropriate and each individual set of circumstances needs to be considered, because to try to cover every eventuality in legislation would be nonsense. We can, against that phraseology, ensure that no injustice will be done to individuals, and they will have plenty of room to explain and say that they were operating in a practical, common-sense fashion. 
Amendment No. 102 would mean that we could enforce any requirement to notify loss. The hon. Member for Winchester is not seeking to ensure that the Bill proceeds on that basis—in fact, he does not want the Bill to proceed at all—but to explore why we need a means of enforcement. The requirement to notify becomes meaningless if there is no means of enforcement. It is vital that card holders are under an enforceable obligation to notify the scheme of the loss of a card, or a suspected loss, which might be just as important, so that cards can quickly be cancelled. 
The hon. Gentleman asks for the reasons why we may want to enforce that obligation, and I shall give them to him. First, we would risk people choosing not to notify a loss, and any lost cards in circulation could fall into the wrong hands, whether accidentally or on purpose. All hon. Members have some concerns about that in relation to passports. A significant number of passports go missing in the hands of individuals—although thankfully far fewer of them now in the hands of the UK Passport Service—or en route to and from there, than was once the case, because of the procedures that are now in place. However, far too many passports go missing in the hands of individuals, and those generate a significant concern. There is a process whereby notification of the loss of a passport puts it on a warnings index, so if it is used at our borders it can be checked. Hon. Members who have been travelling recently will know that there is significant security as passports are checked against the warnings index. 
Once the cards are out there and in the wrong hands they can be used for unauthorised purposes, including non-biometric verification, to obtain goods fraudulently and in potential attempts to circumvent card security features by tampering with them or disassembling them. 
Secondly, the scheme's security and fraud management function must be aware of any serial loss of identity cards, such that it can counter the threat that that poses to the scheme's security. I am surprised how often the same individuals lose the same valuable documents. Serial loss is now, in intelligence terms, valuable information for those authorities that  we charge with the responsibility of looking after secure documents. 
Finally, if the card is damaged it may prevent an individual from using public services efficiently. We need to ensure that we can quickly reissue cards in such circumstances.

Mark Oaten: On that point, imagining that somebody tries to access a public service, such as an accident and emergency department, and the card goes in, fails and is damaged, there is clearly a responsibility on the individual to report that the card is damaged, but is there any responsibility on the public services to make a note that the card is damaged or that the individual has reported that their card is lost?

Des Browne: The regulations that may apply to an individual public service provider will be a matter for discussion at a later stage, in the context of regulation making. I will bear the hon. Gentleman's suggestion in mind. I cannot imagine that it has not already occurred to officials that if damaged cards were to be presented that would be a good opportunity to feed information back into the scheme. It may only be at that point of presentation, when one looks at the definition, that it becomes apparent that the card is damaged. It would seem sensible that if there is a communication to the scheme at that point, there would be notification of that information. However, that matter would have to be dealt with by regulations. The proposal seems sensible and if it can be done, we should do it.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: The Minister told us at the beginning of this Committee that for first-time passport applications people would have to attend the office to prove that they were the person who was entitled to the passport. Will the same be true of ID cards? If not, a lot of ID cards could be sent all over the place and not go to the people who are entitled to them.
Secondly, an underworld industry will grow up to impersonate people with wrong cards. The technology will get to such a pitch that people will be able to tamper with cards. Will the Government constantly review the intelligence about what is happening to cards, and will it be possible to alter very easily the whole nation's ID cards to deal with a fraud as it emerges?

Des Browne: The hon. Gentleman raises two good points. On the first, I have already told the Committee that the collection of the biometrics will require that interaction, which we are now putting into first-time passports. He will be reassured that the collection of biometrics will involve a face-to-face relationship, and that that will be an opportunity to make all the necessary checks to ensure the level of integrity and security that he believes should be in the system.
The second question that the hon. Gentleman asked was whether we will ensure that the security of the system is maintained to the very highest standards and that there is an intelligence-based information gathering unit as part of that, to ensure that as people develop attempts to beat the system, we will be able to anticipate them. Of course there will be. 
This part of the scheme is designed to gather information very quickly about cards that might be damaged, lost or stolen, and to be part of that intelligence gathering system to ensure integrity. There would be no point otherwise. The purpose of the proposal is to give people the reassurance that their identity is being protected. The scheme needs to protect their identity, because that is the place where all information will be collected. 
We have understandably moved slightly beyond the amendments into a bit of a clause stand part debate. I should reiterate that the requirements to notify loss will be in regulations that will be subject to a negative resolution procedure. We are planning for the scheme to provide simple mechanisms for reporting lost or stolen cards through a single point of contact accessible via telephone, e-mail, post or web portal. 
I understand the concerns of hon. Members for people who might, through no fault of their own, fail to report a loss or be unable to surrender a card. I hope that I have reassured them that the offences under clause 13 are proportionate, necessary and will be applied in a proportionate manner that understands the vagaries of everyday life and people's lifestyle patterns. Accordingly, I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins: That is a helpful response from the Minister, and on that basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mark Oaten: I beg to move amendment No. 170, in page 11, line 31, at end insert—
'(2A) The Secretary of State may, in an urgent case, cancel the card forthwith or otherwise give notice to the individual of an intention to do so. 
(2B) The Secretary of State shall send notification of his cancellation or his intention to cancel in writing to the individual who shall have the right to make representations accordingly. 
(2C) The Secretary of State shall review his cancellation or his intention in the light of such representations. 
(2D) The individual may appeal a cancellation of his ID card to the Commissioner.'. 
Again, I do not intend to delay the Committee a great deal. The clause and the amendment deal with the powers of the Secretary of State to cancel a card. I have no problem with that and understand the need for him to have such power. However, I have a concern about the way in which individuals will know if the Secretary of State has cancelled their card. I would not want somebody who was trying to access benefit or health care to turn up, put their card through, and for a red light to flash, telling them that their card had been cancelled. That person would ask the doctor or what used to be the Benefits Agency, ''Why? What have I done wrong?'' and would be told, ''I have no idea at all, but I am sorry—your card is cancelled.'' The person would then phone through and discover that the Government had cancelled their card and, I hope, be given the reasons why. There is a danger that cards could be cancelled without warning,  and that that would put individuals into very embarrassing situations or make them unable to access public services. 
My second point relates to my first. Obviously, there would be reasons for a cancellation. According to the clause, there could be a cancellation if there had been 
''a modification of information recorded in the entry''.
Will the Minister explain how that modification of information could take place? Would the individual always know that the change had taken place? Could that change on the register be made without the individual's knowing about it? If so, I want some reassurance that the system would allow that individual to challenge that change and say, ''You cancelled my card because you made a modification to the information, but that modification is totally wrong.'' 
Some clarification on those points would be helpful. Taking the card away, particularly given how much the Government want the card to be used, could have a serious impact for individuals. I want to understand the circumstances in which the card would be taken away, who would be told about the reasons and—importantly—when.

Des Browne: The hon. Gentleman has been very clear about why he tabled the amendment, the effect of which would be to make the process of cancelling cards much longer. That point is probably ancillary to his principal argument, which I shall deal with.
The hon. Gentleman is right to say that the clause has been drafted to allow the Secretary of State to cancel cards to protect individuals from the misuse of their cards and identities. We are already planning for the processes for replacing or cancelling cards, or for changing entitlement, to include notifying the cardholder after a card has been cancelled. We would not just cancel a card without informing the relevant individual. We are also clear that until there is a specific further parliamentary decision and a move to compulsion, an individual would always have options other than an ID card available for proving their identities. 
Both pre- and post-compulsion, we want to ensure that when a card is used to access public services, procedures are in place to help those whose card has been lost or stolen, and therefore cancelled—especially in cases of emergency. We have always said that emergency and necessary treatment would never depend on the production of an ID card. When we develop the processes, we will be mindful that people who are legitimately entitled to have access to public services should have a mechanism to do that when they are acting in good faith. 
On the change of information in relation to the card, I should say that if the amendment were agreed to, it could be misused by individuals in cases when the card should be cancelled, but it is advantageous for the individual to prolong their ownership of it. For example, if a person's immigration status changes and they want to continue to use their card as proof of their entitlement to work, they should not have such a prolonged period of ownership. Such an individual  would know about the change. They would know that they had an entitlement to work for a particular period and when that would come to an end, and they would have the relevant responsibilities. All changes triggering the cancellation of a card would involve circumstances in which the implication was that those changes were known to the individual. There is no intention that factors outwith an individual's control or responsibility should trigger that sort of action.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I hope that I am raising only important points. What will be the position of prisoners? Will their cards be withdrawn, and, if so, how will they access public services such as health services? If the Minister does not have the answer to that to hand, I will be happy for him to write to me about it.

Des Browne: I see no reason why prisoners should not continue to hold identity cards. They are sentenced to a term of imprisonment as their penalty; they are not sent there for further punishment. It may be the case that an order of the court and the sentence that they are currently serving means that their ability to do other things is inhibited and they have limited use of the identity card, but there is no reason why they should not hold one. Indeed, my understanding of the Bill suggests to me that they will be required to have one if they are resident in the UK during the trigger period—as many of them will be, of course.

Mark Oaten: If the Committee will indulge me, it is interesting that the Minister makes the point that they are still citizens, because that is not the status of a prisoner; they lose their citizenship, which is why the Government have argued that they should not have the right to vote. Can I briefly draw the Minister into that debate?

Des Browne: The hon. Gentleman is drawing me into a debate that is only marginally in order. He makes an assertion in relation to citizenship and prisoners that I do not recognise. He may make it from a background of knowledge that once someone is sentenced they are no longer a citizen, but I do not recognise that as being a consequence of being a convicted prisoner serving a sentence. There is an impediment on prisoners in relation to the franchise, but I understand that that comes from a different historical basis than whether or not they are citizens. Whether that is still justifiable in the modern age is a matter for debate by Parliament, although not in this context.
The notification of modifications to the register was a subject of amendments to clause 3 discussed last week, and I refer hon. Members to columns 95 and 96 of the record of the debate for Tuesday 18 January for further elucidation on that, as I do not propose to repeat what was said. 
Under clause 24(2), the national identity scheme commissioner already has the function of being able to review the use of the Secretary of State's power under clause 13. That is a further consideration in terms of restrictions to that power. 
I understand hon. Members' concerns, and I hope that I have reassured them. There is nothing in any of the points that have been raised that has not already  been thought of, or debated via the consultation process. The clause accommodates all those considerations, and nobody needs to be concerned about them.

Mark Oaten: I take reassurance from the Minister's comments, particularly on the ability to access emergency services and help, and the fact that the card will not be required for that.
I take some reassurance on the other points, although the Minister did not deal with the issue of whether the Secretary of State has the power to make a modification to the register without the individual concerned knowing why that modification has been made. I was a little concerned that modifications could take place without individuals knowing about them, and that their cards would be taken under those circumstances. I hope that I can interpret the Minister's comments as saying that there will not be circumstances in which the point at which an individual discovers that their card has been cancelled is when they turn up to claim a benefit and a red light flashes to say that it has been cancelled. I hope that the Government really are thinking that if there is a need to cancel a card, every attempt will be made to contact the individual early on, so that they do not at a later date find themselves in the embarrassing situation of being told by someone else that their card has been cancelled. 
As the Minister has given us some reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Humfrey Malins: I have a couple of points to make that have cropped up in the debate. Let us suppose that a person is in possession of an ID card that was issued to another person. Had I thought of it, I might have tabled an amendment to draw attention to the fact that there is a difference between innocent possession of card that belongs to another person and criminal intent. It is a small point, but, for example, an elderly person may forget to take his ID card to hospital to receive treatment so a relative takes the card to the hospital. It is a clear case of innocent, genuine possession. Perhaps the Minister can confirm that that cannot give rise to a penalty.
Mr. Browne rose—

Humfrey Malins: May I finish my other point? It is very small and, if the Minister destroys my first point, I will have virtually nothing left to say. I just want confirmation that innocent possession of a card is okay and that no one will ask for it back.
I do not think that such events will happen, but I cannot envisage a court demanding the surrender of an identity card as a condition of bail. The Minister will know that, under the Bail Act 1976, a court can demand the surrender of a passport or travel documents. An ID card is not a travel document. Or is it? I do not believe that a court will have the power to order its surrender. If a judge orders the surrender of a card, we will have a problem because, apparently,  the Home Secretary can give the judge a frightfully tough time for asking for its surrender.

Des Browne: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for allowing me to point out that, when a person has an ID card in their possession in circumstances such as he has framed, the person can be reassured that they will have a card in their possession with lawful authority. That is covered under clause 13(3)(a). The person need not be at all concerned about that, if he has the lawful authority of the individual to whom it was issued.
As for the hon. Gentleman's second point, he touched on another matter of information that will be of interest to the general public and members of the Committee. It will be helpful to put it on the record. It is our intention that the ID card will be a travel document within the European Union for British citizens. My understanding of the Bail Act powers is that they cover all travel documents. Identity cards issued to British citizens can be used as travel documents so the court could, if it were minded, restrict the person's ability to travel by ordering surrender of their identity card, as well as their passport and other travel documents. I say that with some advised certainty because I have not practised law in England and do not know the detailed provisions of the Bail Act in England and Wales. I suspect, however, that, because there are travel documents other than passports, the phraseology used in the Bail Act is ''travel documents''. I am advised that that is correct, so it will cover an ID card.

Humfrey Malins: When the court requires as a condition of bail the surrender of a passport, I am not entirely sure that the Secretary of State either can or does require the court to surrender the passport to him or her. It seems from the Bill, however, that if a travel document or an ID card were surrendered as a condition of bail—often an important condition—the Home Secretary could demand its surrender to him.

Des Browne: If I am incorrect, I may have to return to the matter, but I venture to suggest that the court, because it has authority under the Bail Act to require the surrender of the document as a condition of a person's release on bail, would have the permission of the Secretary of State.

Humfrey Malins: Implied.

Des Browne: Clearly, it is the implied permission of the Secretary of State because the Secretary of State is responsible for the state of law. If such matters need further clarification, I shall provide it in some other way. However, that is the argument. If my response has allowed members of the Committee to consider whether they agree that the clause should stand part, I do not have anything to add.
Question put and agreed to. 
Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 - Use of information for verification or

Mark Oaten: I beg to move amendment No. 103, in page 12, line 35, after 'a,' insert 'prescribed'.

Janet Anderson: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 171, in page 12, line 35, after 'with', insert 'all of the'.
No. 172, in page 12, line 41, leave out subsection (2). 
No. 50, in page 13, line 26, leave out subsection (4).

Mark Oaten: These are probing amendments. I do not intend to take long.
I have a number of questions about the provision for the Secretary of State, in essence, to tell other organisations and people about information recorded on the register. In this clause, that can be done with the permission of the individual on whom information is being released. That makes sense. I understand circumstances under which an individual might want to convince a bank or similar body about their status or address. They may want information held on the register to be released to a bank. Under such circumstances, these days I would have to go in to the branch with gas bills and things. A quick way to register would be useful. 
The first question to the Minister is whether he could explain the types of organisation that he envisages approaching the Government for information about an individual. 
Secondly, if there were concerns about passing some information on—even if the individual had given permission—are there no-go areas for the Government? Could the Government say that it was inappropriate for certain organisations to have the information; that they were uneasy about their having material held on the register? 
The third and final point is how the Secretary of State will define what consent means. In other words, what proof will the Government need that someone has agreed that the information should be passed on? Organisations or groups may have said, ''Tick the box if we can approach the Secretary of State for information.''

Janet Anderson: Order. We will be considering the form of consent later in our deliberations. If the hon. Gentleman could restrict his remarks to the amendments, I would be grateful.

Mark Oaten: I shall abide by the ruling. I was referring to the kinds of organisation that would be asking for information under clause 14. I am not sure where the later reference is. Perhaps I could have some guidance from the Chair. Is that in a later clause or a later amendment?

Janet Anderson: We are discussing the group of amendments led by amendment No. 47 to clause 14, in the name of Mr. Mercer and others.

Mark Oaten: In which case, I will restrict my remarks at this stage to the organisations and how the  Government will treat the information that goes to those organisations. I hope that the Minister will reassure me. With the later group of amendments, I will deal with the issue of how to prove that someone has allowed that organisation to have the information.

Des Browne: Amendment No. 103 would mean that the Secretary of State could provide information only to prescribed persons rather than to a person. That would mean that anybody using the verification service would have to be prescribed in regulation.
Importantly, under clause 14 the individual is consenting to the provision of his information to the organisations that he chooses. Prescribing certain organisations would not be helpful at this stage. Part of the selling point of the scheme, as it were, is that we are offering individuals an opportunity to prove their identity against a gold standard. What we want is extensive use of this scheme, with people's confidence and consent. 
The scheme does, however, contain substantial safeguards as to whom the information may be provided. There is a power in subsection (5) to make regulations as to 
''the persons by whom, and the circumstances in which, an application''
for information can made. There is already a power in subsection (6) to require that 
''the person to whom''
information 
''is provided has registered prescribed particulars about himself''.
That would apply to an organisation and would be approved in the prescribed manner. 
Subsection (6) makes it clear that the regulations can put conditions on the grant of approval and provides for approval to be suspended or withdrawn. Those regulations will be subject to a negative resolution procedure in the House. There will be an opportunity to look in detail at how that aspect can be policed. 
We will deal shortly with how consent can be communicated and verified, but it is not necessary to go further and require each applicant or organisation to be prescribed. For example, if an individual wanted an organisation to be able to verify their identity using the scheme, there would be a lengthy period before it could do so if we had to go back to Parliament. 
Amendments Nos. 171 and 172 would allow the Secretary of State to provide all the information from the register with the consent of the individual and remove the restrictions and provisions of information under subsections (2) and (3). The amendment is not necessary. As I have said before, the Data Protection Act 1998 will apply to the identity card scheme, including the national identity register, and the existing subject access rights under the Act will apply. 
Subsection (8) makes it clear that existing rights are not affected by the power in clause 14 and the 1998 Act includes exemptions that ensure that information that it might not be in the public interest to disclose would not have to be provided. That is the right approach. We are also considering ways of ensuring  that an individual will be able easily to read his card and register entry. 
Removing subsection (2), as suggested in amendment No. 172, would also remove a safeguard to individuals, which was explicitly included following the comments on the draft Bill from organisations and individuals who wanted to ensure that organisations could be provided only with information that was relevant to them for verifying the identity of their customer. 
To provide part of the reassurance that the hon. Member for Winchester seeks, subsection (2) excludes information that is provided and held by the scheme to ensure the integrity of the register—such as the record history, registration and ID card history, validation information provided by the individual, security information about entry and the records of provision of information—but which is not required by organisations checking to verify the identity of their customer. It also provides that fingerprint and other biometric information cannot be provided on a verification check under the clause; it can be used only to confirm or refuse confirmation that details provided by the person concerned match those on the register. 
The amendment would mean that organisations could be provided with information that is not relevant to them and which the individual might not want revealed for obvious reasons. For example, the registration and ID card history relating to the reason why any omission from the information was recorded in his entry could include a medical reason why a biometric could not be given, which is not relevant to proving identity. That would also harm the security of the scheme, because we could then be asked to provide security information held about an individual, including their PIN or security code, which, as the clause is drafted, could only be confirmed as correct or incorrect if it was provided to us. 
I seek your guidance, Ms Anderson, on whether it is relevant for me to deal with amendment No. 50, which has not been spoken to so far. Perhaps I should just ignore it, and if it is not referred to we need not trouble with it further. 
I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment in the light of the reassurance that I have sought to provide. If he requires further details, I will try to provide them.

Mark Oaten: The Minister has given me some reassurance. In essence, he is saying that the only information that any individual could ask to be passed on to another organisation is not a great deal more than confirmation of their address. The provision does not seem to add much more information beyond confirming the address. The Minister ruled out quite a lot of other things that could be on the list. If the process is similar to providing a gas or telephone bill, I am reassured to some extent.
I remain cautious and nervous, however, about the number of organisations that could ask for the information and would feel a lot happier if there were a prescribed set of organisations to which it could be passed. However, it is difficult to disentangle this,  despite the Chair's ruling on consent, because if I feel comfortable about the issue of consent, I may feel a lot more comfortable about all sorts of organisations having that information. If I do not feel comfortable about the issue, I will move to the conclusion that we should have a prescribed list of organisations. Your ruling, Ms Anderson, makes it difficult for me to conclude on the issue, because the two matters are closely connected. However, I will reserve my remarks until we get to the issue of consent. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 47, in page 12, line 38, after 'the', insert 'written'.

Janet Anderson: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 104, in page 12, line 38, after 'the,' insert 'informed'.
No. 48, in page 12, line 39, after 'otherwise', insert 'in writing'. 
No. 105, in page 12, line 39, after 'otherwise' insert 'explicitly'. 
No. 49, in page 12, line 40, at end insert 
'and 
(c) authority or consent may extend to part only of information.'. 
No. 124, in clause 43, page 35, line 40, at end insert— 
'''consent'', in relation to a particular individual, shall mean any freely given specific and informed indication of that individual's wishes by which he signifies his agreement to the use of his ID card or the access to, or provision of, information contained in his entry in the Register;'.

Humfrey Malins: I shall be brief. We are talking about a clause that enables the provision of an identity verification service, operating with the individual's consent. As the Minister will see, my amendments are all alike. Each one refers to whether it might be sensible to ensure that the individual's authority and consent is given in writing. There is a further reference to the definition of ''consent'' in amendment No. 124. The issue is really a question of whether written consent would be more beneficial than consent given orally.

Mark Oaten: This gets to the heart of the consent issue. The hon. Gentleman's point is well made; there needs to be a system that makes sure that we really know that an individual has given their consent, and a submission, whether or not it is written, is one way of securing that consent.
My concern is that some organisations might produce tick boxes that people are asked to tick, and the small print might say, ''To give us consent to access information about you on the register.'' We want to clamp down on that practice, which we know is used so often in marketing drives and by all sorts of insurance and bank companies. We tear a slip off, and somewhere we have ticked a box saying, ''I am happy for information about me on the register to be shared.'' It is that point that troubles me, and I want reassurances from the Minister that safeguards can be  put in place. If safeguards cannot be put in place to ensure correct interpretation of the actions of individuals who have been in a sense tricked into giving their consent, I would be concerned that we would not have a prescribed list on this issue.

Des Browne: I am sorry that my response will be longer than the question, but it was understood that it necessarily would be.
As the hon. Member for Woking said in his short introduction, the amendments set out specific limits on how consent or authority can be transmitted for the purposes of security, and are designed to tease out the Government's thinking on the subject. It will not surprise hon. Members to hear that we do not consider the amendment defining ''consent'' to be necessary. We consider it self-explanatory that consent for a check to be made in the register must be freely given by a person who understands that his card, or, as the case may be, his biometrics, have been used to verify his identity. We do not consider the term ''consent'' to be ambiguous, and thus to require statutory definition, in this context. 
Amendment No. 104 would make it a requirement for an application for the provision of information to be with the ''informed'' authority of that individual, rather than just the ''authority''. For reasons similar to those that I gave in relation to ''consent'', we believe that it should be taken as read that ''authority'' means a freely given and informed authority. I should also mention that under subsection (5)(a) there is power to make provision in regulations on how an ''authority'' for the purposes of subsection (1)(a) is to be given. 
Amendment No. 49 would allow an individual to choose to consent to provide only part of the information falling within subsections (2) and (3). The clause already sets out a limited list of information that may be provided in response to a verification application. There is a power under subsection (4)(b) to make regulations to impose further restrictions if necessary. In addition, it is our intention that, by virtue of the accreditation process provided for in subsection (6), organisations will be provided only with information that supports their business needs—that is, with a limited part of the individual's entry, as permitted under subsection (1). 
There are a number of limitations on the information that could be provided in response to an application by an organisation for verification. Beyond that, it would be up to an individual to choose not to give their consent at all and to take their business elsewhere, but it would not be feasible to provide for that individual to place further limitations on the information that could be provided in any given transaction. However, we take the view that the clause as drafted already allows for sufficient limitations to ensure that the information provided in response is necessary and not excessive. 
The requirement to give written consent would limit the potential benefits of the scheme in providing a convenient method for individuals to prove their identity and for organisations to be able to prove to the highest standard that a person is who they say they are. If written consent were required, rather than  having organisations build on their current consent processes or those that best fit with their user requirements—for example, each time I hand over my credit card I am not required to give written consent—organisations would incur a significant cost and overhead, which may lead them to decide not to use the scheme. 
We are examining how to verify that the individual has consented to their information being provided. The clause provides that regulations may be made prescribing how the individual's authority will be given. They would be subject to the negative resolution procedure in Parliament. There will be a number of options, depending on the circumstances, and various consent mechanisms are being reviewed. They include the use of PINs and biometrics where a card holder is present. 
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

Des Browne: I was in the process of addressing the issue that was of most interest to the hon. Member for Winchester: the options that we are devising for recording and communicating consent depending on the circumstances. Of course, they will be of interest to other hon. Members. I advised the Committee that they include the use of PINs, which are becoming well known in the context of credit cards and other financial cards, and biometrics where the card holder is present.
For situations in which the card holder is not present, options include signed consent forms as well as contractual agreements between the user and information requestor. Those areas most concerned the hon. Gentleman. He can have my reassurance that we will seek the highest level of propriety, to satisfy ourselves that consent to the circumstances of a contract is informed consent and not incidental consent.

Mark Oaten: Will the Minister be clear about marketing tools, which involve tick boxes and small print? It would be reassuring if he were to say that he is not seeking that kind of consent but something of a higher standard.

Des Browne: I am on record as being critical of the way individuals have agreed the collection of a significant amount of their information with private organisations, in the context of loyalty cards and other cards, without the necessary level of informed consent. I am far from satisfied that people realise when they sign up exactly how much information about themselves they are allowing private commercial organisations to have. I will certainly not be responsible for regulations or consent forms that replicate that in this area of public policy.

David Curry: I want to inform the Minister about one small exception. I have just been refused a card at Waitrose on the grounds that it could not find any record of any other transactions, merely because I do not build up debts on my credit card. Not having accumulated debts, I was refused a card.

Des Browne: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for telling us about the disgraceful and scandalous way in which he has been treated by an institution in this country. Waitrose does not know what it is missing, and it will live to regret its decision.
We will demand the highest standards of security for this scheme, but requiring written consent each time without regard to the circumstances would be impractical and would negate many of the scheme's benefits. Therefore, I invite the hon. Member for Woking to withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins: We have had a most helpful response, and on that basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 51, in clause 14, page 14, line 6, at end add—
'(9) If an individual applies to the Secretary of State for the provision to himself of all or any information recorded in his entry in the Register, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to supply to the individual all such information requested.'. 
This has crept up on me rather more quickly than I had hoped. The amendment is another example of openness and frankness. As the Bill is currently phrased, what are the circumstances under which I can go to the Home Secretary and ask what is on the register about me as I would like it for my memoirs? 
Alternatively, would the introduction of the amendment add anything that would be to my benefit? This is a probing amendment. I move it in that spirit.

Des Browne: The amendment would place a duty on the Secretary of State to provide all or any details requested by an individual included in the register if those details related to his own entry. It is substantially unnecessaryemdash not totally unnecessary, because there are some exemptions that I shall deal with.
As I have already told the Committee on a number of occasions, the Data Protection Act 1998 will apply to the identity card scheme. The national identity register and existing subject access rights under that Act will apply. Broadly speaking, individuals will be able to access information on the register about themselves at their own request. 
The Data Protection Act includes exemptions that ensure that information that might not be in the public interest to disclose would not have to be provided. That is already accounted for and well understood in the context of the clause.. This is the right approach. I recollect that the draft Bill contained a clause that cast some doubt on this matter. 
One of the further benefits of consultation in pre-legislative scrutiny is that that provision has now been removed from the Bill to clarify it. In addition, we are looking at ways of ensuring that an individual will be able to read his or her card and register entry as easily as possible. For example, we may be able to offer a service whereby an individual could read the information held in his or her entry securely through the internet or public service kiosks. I may have said that three or four times to the Committee and I apologise for repeating myself. Hon. Members may be  reassured that the spirit of the amendment is already covered in the scheme. The amendment is unnecessary and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

Humfrey Malins: The Minister's reply has helped us. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15 - Power to make public services conditional on identity checks

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 144, in clause 15, page 14, line 13, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c).
This is a quite important amendment. Clause 15 deals with powers to make services conditional on identity checks. We must be realistic and confirm what public services we are talking about. The Minister will be able to do that. I assume that he means access to the doctoremdash save for emergency treatment that must be available automatically to anybody; other medical services such as dentistry; local authority housing or education; or a variety of public services—[Interruption.]. 
My hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown) has helpfully pointed out the benefits. It helps to know what public services we are talking about. The clause states that regulations can make it a condition that before I get those services I produce to the person who is going to provide them an ID card, other evidence of registrable facts about myself or both under subsections (1)(b) and (c), which I seek to omit. They are heavy handed. Can the Minister justify his position? 
I do not know when the regulations will be introduced. I could be the sort of person who has not yet been issued with an identity card, but may be under an obligation to provide registrable facts to the Secretary of State. When I have done that, it may be some while before I am asked for an identity card. 
I find this measure incongruous. I am used to being asked to produce a card for various functions, so that is not a problem for me, but I am concerned about the reference to 
''other evidence of registrable facts . . . or
(c) both.''
That might create a burden on the individual. I ask the Minister to be kind enough to justify that requirement, and to explain the circumstances in which it might operate, in particular in relation to different people.

David Curry: The clause begins by stating:
''Regulations may make provision allowing or requiring''.
It appears that there is a permissiveness in the legislation. People might well be required to establish their identity, but what does ''allowing'' mean in that context? Does it mean that one GP surgery might require that and another might not? With regard to certain public services—such as when someone applies for a senior citizen's railcard or a bus pass—might  some local authorities require that and others might not? What are the circumstances in which there would be that discretion? 
How will I know whether the person I am dealing with has the authority to demand that, on a discretionary basis? I would expect to know for which services I need to take my card. The Minister said that we will not have to carry the cards, but the Prime Minister has used the expression ''carry the cards.'' If there will be discretionary requirements, the Minister must tell us about the circumstances for that, and the framework within which that discretion might be used. 
Those wonderful expressions ''may'' and ''allow'' leave a lot more room than ''must'' and ''shall require''. I would be interested to know what thoughts the Minister has in his mind.

Des Browne: What I have in my mind is that across the public sector there are already many situations in which statutory services require an individual to produce proof of identity—for example, when receiving benefits or when initially registering with a GP. However, of necessity, people doe not need to prove their identity every time they have an interaction with any such services. Part of GP services is to build up relationships, and one would hope that a GP would come to know a person whom they see regularly, and would be able to recognise them. The idea that people will have to produce these cards in all circumstances and for every transaction is neither tenable nor logical, and it is highly improbable—impossible, I would venture to suggest—that a set of regulations would be drafted in such a way.
There are any number of potential relationships in public services where people need to prove their identity, and all of them are potentially capable of being subject to regulations under clause 15. It gives a power to make regulations requiring an ID card or ''evidence of registrable facts'', or both, in order to be provided with a public service. 
This measure is not intended to facilitate interfering with or changing a person's entitlements. It is merely intended to give service providers flexibility in deciding what proof of identity is the most appropriate in particular circumstances, and what level of identity check is necessary. 
The regulations that can be made under this clause require prior consultation with members of the public likely to be affected, followed by parliamentary consent under the affirmative resolution procedure. There will need to be a separate decision for each service. There will be plenty of opportunity to have detailed discussions on whether, depending on the nature of the service that it provides, a service provider should have the flexibility to require people to produce the highest level of identity. Such things can be tailored to suit individual circumstances, and we do not intend to be prescriptive in this legislation. For example, cost-benefit analysis will have to be done on benefits to ascertain whether the highest level of check would be appropriate, and for what number of transactions. Such decisions will be made in the fullness of time. 
The other important point is that, under clause 15, we cannot require a person to produce an ID card to receive payments, such as social security benefits, or free public services, such as NHS treatment, until it is compulsory for that person to register under clause 6. That seems logical as well, and is a further protection against full compulsion by the back door.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I wish to probe the Minister a little more on the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon (Mr. Curry). Will local authorities be given discretion on whether they require an identity card for the payment of housing benefit, for example? If that is to be the case, how would a citizen know whether their local authority required the production of the card and whether it was legitimately able to do so?
The same could apply to hospitals. Will some hospital trusts require the cards to be produced and others not, or will there be uniformity across the country? How much discretion will there be?

Des Browne: That will be set out in regulations, which will be consulted on at the appropriate time. It is not for me to say at this stage; we are so far away from compulsion. The hon. Gentleman mentions one service, housing benefit, that provides payment and another, the NHS, that provides a service free of charge. Producing the card could not be made a compulsory condition of the provision of those services until there was full compulsion on the card itself.
At some time, there will need to be consultation with the service users and others on what is appropriate and what benefits such compulsion would bring. Regulations, subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, would have to be introduced. I cannot imagine that such regulations could be enacted without people knowing what was going on. People would be aware of such a significant step, and those providing the services would have the responsibility of ensuring that those to whom the new regulations applied were notified about them. There would have to be a lead-in time. The configuration of the regulations will be a matter for that time. Such decisions will be made once confidence in the scheme and the card has been built up.

Mark Oaten: I understand that the Minister does not want to say whether there will be regional variations on whether people will need the cards for access to public services. Given the Government's determination to use the cards to crack down on benefit fraud, surely the requirement would have to be national and uniform. Otherwise, individuals would go to different parts of the country where they would know that they do not have to have a card, and could abuse the system.

Des Browne: The simple answer is that benefit regulations apply uniformly across the United Kingdom. Regulations on NHS treatment do not apply uniformly because, for example, the Scottish Parliament makes decisions about the provision of that public service. The right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon has raised that issue on a number of  occasions. However, that is not about the identity card scheme. There will be no discrimination in relation to the scheme across the country, although decisions may well be made, for example, by the Scottish Parliament about what level of proof of identity will be required for a person to access NHS treatment. That would be a matter entirely for the Scottish Parliament. People in the Committee may disagree with devolution, but that is what it is about.
That does not undermine this scheme, which is about providing opportunities. The Government, who are responsible for the provision of NHS services across England and Wales, will make a decision about access; that will almost certainly be uniform and there will be no discrimination. It would not be appropriate for there to be discrimination.

Mark Oaten: The Minister is now beginning to answer the question that was put to him earlier. Would there be a difference between local authorities? Would there be a difference between primary care trusts? We are in England, never mind devolution. The hon. Gentleman is saying that there will be a uniform system throughout England and that primary care trusts, for example, will not be able to opt in or opt out of it, so there will be no particular focus in certain areas where there may be worry about so-called health tourism.

Des Browne: I cannot be prescriptive about how such matters will be phased out. It does not seem, however, that arguments can be made for discrimination of that nature. I stand before the Committee and, if there is a problem on my part, I apologise. I do not know every detail about where the powers of local authorities lie. What I am about to say might be contradicted: local authorities exercise appropriately and are answerable politically to their electorate for decisions that they make about some services.
We need some flexibility that allows those layers of responsibility to be properly reflected. The best example of that is devolution. I understand the difference between the provision of certain services and political accountability in Scotland as opposed to the rest of the United Kingdom and I understand, to a degree, that if there were a devolved Administration in Northern Ireland what the position would be. There will be the opportunity for flexibility for those who provide the services there. Indeed, politicians from Scotland have suggested what their attitude would be towards accessing public services via the identity card. It will be entirely a matter for them. It will not be helpful if I try to envisage each set of circumstances, because I could not do that. The clause is drawn in such a way that reflects those responsibilities. I shall not bind together other individual organisations and authorities, because I do not have the power to do so, in any event. 
May I deal quickly with the points on which the amendment concentrates? Why does the provision cover ''an ID card'' and 
''other evidence of registrable facts''?
Well, the answer is comparatively simple. People might need access to public services, but might have lost their  card and not received a replacement. Such people should not be denied access to services if they can via registrable facts access the services and prove their identity. That is the beauty of the system. It will not depend on people carrying cards—a point that we might come to in more detail in a couple of minutes.

Humfrey Malins: I might have misunderstood the clause, for which I apologise. When I examined it more carefully, I realised that it says that public services are free; that they are services for which there can be no charge. Am I right? As a result, no service can demand from me an ID. That must cover most public services.

Des Browne: We may well come to such matters in more stark relief under another amendment, but the reference to public services that are free of charge does not deny the opportunity for the providers of public services to require the production of an identity card or access under clause 15 before it is compulsory to have a card. Post-compulsion is a different matter. At that time, there will be a point when registrable facts for each individual can be implied because they will be on the register. There will be a different position.
However, people may have forgotten their card, lost it or have put it into a reader that does not work because it is damaged and no one knows about it. In those circumstances, people should not be denied access to public services if, through registrable facts, they can prove their identity. Equally, there may be normal circumstances in which the public service provider would accept the card, but has suspicions about it. It may say that it wants the card and registrable facts for that individual on that occasion because it is suspicious of the circumstances and the way in which the card has been presented. It is appropriate that circumstances allow regulations to be drafted to cover those eventualities.

David Curry: A provider could ask for the card, which would presumably carry the person's current or most recent address. If it asked for the registrable facts and the person had been to prison, those facts would include the address at Her Majesty's prison, so the person's past would be revealed to a provider, although the card would not do so. Have I misunderstood it?

Des Browne: Yes. The regulations will be drawn in such a way that the person will be entitled to access information that can prove identity, not historical information that may need to be kept in relation to the card for other security reasons, or for audit reasons associated with the individual, who may want to check against facts.
I have already explained that the registrable facts to which people will have access in the context of proving identity will be restricted to proof of identity. That would not cover the situation that the hon. Gentleman describes, and would not give people access to historical information that is none of their business.

Mark Oaten: I am sorry to intervene a lot, but I am trying to be clear in my mind. If the purpose of having the card for public services is to deal with problems of benefit fraud, surely just having the identity will not be  very helpful, because we all know that identity is not the main means of benefit fraud. The real problem is individuals over-claiming, or patterns. Surely those services would need access to more than just the identity, including access to other information to prove whether a person is working and over-claiming. If they are to tackle fraud they will need access to information other than a person's identity.

Des Browne: The fact that a person is working at the time is not a registrable fact. This is about proving people's identity. The security of the benefits system is a matter for the Benefits Agency, which uses relevant regulations and requirements to obtain information from people. It is not about giving people additional information of that nature. Of course, information that proves entitlement may need to be accessed, but that will not be the sort of information, such as historical information, that the right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon suggests.
Why would the NHS need historical information about whether a person has been in prison to prove their identity? That is not relevant. The NHS may, however, want to know whether that person is a prisoner now, but I suspect that that would be obvious if they were brought from prison to a hospital. [Interruption.] I may have misunderstood the right hon. Gentleman's point. If he wants to try again, I may be a wee bit more perceptive.

David Curry: The Minister has accidentally answered my question. I said that people may seek the registrable facts about somebody, which may include the address of a prison, so although they may not seek that information, they may nevertheless get it.
Does the Child Support Agency count as a public service? We all know about the difficulty of tracking people—usually men—who are not paying their whack. Would the CSA be able to seek or obtain identity cards and registrable facts to track down the men who are not paying what they are supposed to pay?

Des Browne: The right hon. Gentleman is right. The CSA is a public service in the context of the clause and one can see that there would be benefits in having regulated access to information on the national identity register against circumstances in which people are avoiding their responsibilities, with which Committee members are all-too familiar.
The problem with this debate from my perspective is that it is concentrating on defeating fraud. We have to start from a different point in relation to accessing public services. People already need to prove their identity and entitlement to access them. However, because of the absence of information collected centrally, which is accessible and guaranteed to a high standard, we cannot always be certain that the people who are accessing public services qualify for them. 
We are providing a regulated opportunity for those who provide public services to get access to the registrable facts that they need to establish whether people are eligible to use their services, not all registrable facts. The regulations will not allow every  public service access to all registrable facts, but they will be tailored to the individual public service.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Will the Minister tell us whether any of the information will have a sunset element to it? In the case of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, employers would not be entitled to know that a person has been to prison after a certain period. There are certain financial provisions that the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise are not able to access after a period of time—sometimes that is six years and at other times it is 12 years. Will the information that is provided under the registrable facts be able to be deleted from the card after a period of time?

Des Browne: Under clause 17(1) there is a power to set out in the regulations what information will be provided. In relation to each set of public services, these considerations can be debated, consulted upon and worked out, with the regulations being developed appropriately. It would be illegal to have regulations that were in contravention of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, so they must be drafted in such a way that they take account of that.
I repeat: those regulations will allow only some of the information, depending on the service. I do not see any reason for being concerned that registrable facts that are of no business to the particular service will be accessed. Those services will be denied access to that information, although it may be held for other reasons. Indeed, it may be held because the person whose information is held is entitled to go back and see that this is appropriate.

Mark Oaten: I will have to check Hansard, but I am pretty sure that the Minister implied earlier that the public services will have just the information about identity. He now seems to be implying that the provision will go much further and that they will have access to registered facts. That is an important difference. There is an intellectual logic as to their having access to registered facts if they are going to be able to do the things that they can clarify. For the record, will he confirm that public services will have access to the registered facts?

Des Browne: I can confirm that and I am sorry: it was an omission not to qualify identity in the context of the service.
The clause and other parts of the scheme are drafted in such a way that in the fullness of time, after the compulsion process, regulations can be drawn up that require people to produce evidence of who they are through the scheme and the necessary registrable facts for entitlement. Yes, that is exactly right, but the provision will be restricted to those facts that are necessary to prove entitlement to the particular service.

Jon Owen Jones: I thank my hon. Friend the Minister, who has given way many times. The questions that have been asked so far are about how people ensure that they check on the entitlement according to the list of people  with ID cards. I want to ask my question the other way round.
When there is a compulsory system in which everyone who is entitled is required to have an ID card, will people be able to check who is accessing services and whether they are on the ID card list? For example, by the time the ID card system is introduced, presumably all those in England who are accessing medical care will be on an electronic medical register. If no one is inappropriately accessing that care, everyone on that medical register should also appear on the compulsory ID card register. Should there be such a system to enable us to say, ''Hey, these people are accessing medical care, but they do not appear on the ID card system—what is going wrong?''?

Des Browne: To the extent that I understand my hon. Friend's question, my answer is that we will jealously guard the register to ensure that there is not cross-referencing of the sort that some people would try to persuade us to do, for the obvious reason that this is an identity register. If we started cross-referencing with other registers, it would be possible that information that was nothing to do with people's identity would get on to this register. That is when there is function creep.
We will not put medical records, criminal records or DNA on to this register. The register is about proving people's identity, but to a level that shows whether they are entitled to particular services. Services are a function of circumstances that relate to a person's identity—the footprint of who they are. 
My hon. Friend suggests that there ought, over time, to be a process whereby anybody who is not entitled to free public services but is getting them is identified through not being on the register. Our position is to rely on the providers of services to use the facility to satisfy themselves of the identity and entitlement of the people accessing the services and to make the decisions about the provision of services at the point of provision. There is not some grand sweep going on, except at the point of provision. 
The integrity of the system, and its ability to work and to ensure that people are properly accessing services, will build up over time. That is how we will best ensure that those who are entitled are getting access to their services. That is why we need the part of the clause that the amendment would take out. At that point, we need to be able to offer people the flexibility necessary to allow them to check the card, to check the registrable facts or, in certain circumstances, to check both. That is why the clause is drafted in this way.

Humfrey Malins: We have had a useful debate. It is likely that we will return to the matter on Report.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I wanted to ask the Minister something for the record, but he sat down too quickly. Over time—particularly when the cards become compulsory—my hon. Friend thinks that we will be able to abolish national insurance numbers, as having a national identity card system and a national insurance card system would be pointless and a duplication. Will he press the Minister for clarification?

Humfrey Malins: I am delighted to do so, being quite unable to speculate on the answer, although I am certain in the knowledge that the Minister cannot reply now.

Des Browne: My very quick response is that the national insurance number serves several purposes other than just identifying a person, such as purposes related to other Government functions. At this stage, I cannot see one replacing the other in a short time.

Humfrey Malins: I am grateful to the Minister. As I have said, we will return to the matter on Report. The issue that we have been debating is very important, and it will be so to hon. Members who take part in the debate on the Floor of the House on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 52, in clause 15, page 14, line 23, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
'(3) Failure to produce without reasonable excuse an identity card to a police constable reasonably requiring production shall be a summary offence punishable with 6 months imprisonment or a fine or both.'.

Janet Anderson: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 133, in clause 15, page 14, line 28, at end add—
'(4) Nothing in this section authorises the making of regulations the effect of which would be to require a British citizen to carry or produce an ID card before such time as when all British citizens are required by virtue of section 6 to be entered in the Register.'. 
No. 134, in clause 18, page 16, line 36, at beginning insert 'Subject to subsection (2A)'. 
No. 135, in clause 18, page 16, line 45, at end insert— 
'(2A) Subsection (2) does not authorise the imposition of such condition or requirement in relation to or on a British citizen before such time as when all British citizens are required by virtue of section 6 to be entered in the Register.'. 
No. 187, in clause 18, page 16, line 45, at end insert— 
'(2A) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide further cases in which such a condition or requirement may be imposed in relation to or on an individual.'.

Humfrey Malins: The amendment goes to the heart of the Bill and could give rise to a debate that lasted for hours and hours, but is not going to, because I want to put the matter to the Minister extremely succinctly.
My amendment, on which we shall not vote, takes us back to the point made by so many people. Our constituents and many people out in the country generally know very little about the Bill. They say that if we want to succeed in the war against terror, there is little point in having an identity card that is not compulsory to carry. Furthermore, if someone cannot produce that card, they should be taken into custody until they can establish who they are. 
We all know—we went over the argument many times on Second Reading—that there is a provision under which a person can be required to produce their driving licence for a police officer. Failure to do so can lead to a requirement to produce the licence within seven days at a police station of the person's choice. That would not be at all helpful with respect to  identity cards because—purely as regards terrorism, which we dwelt on so much early in the sitting—it would be of no use in dealing with the potential terrorist, who would simply say, ''Of course I'll produce the card in a few days,'' but never would. 
On Second Reading, a number of distinguished right hon. and hon. Members argued that if the card is to become compulsory—we know that it will—the logic is that it should be compulsory to carry and produce it. If one wants to fight against terrorism, there is a seriously good argument for that. On the other side of the coin, that undoubtedly could be a serious infringement of civil liberties. However, the Bill infringes liberties in many ways, and parts of our argument are devoted to that proposition. We have a set of scales; we weigh one side of the argument against the other to discover the tipping point and the balance. 
Let us not pretend that we are not dealing with civil liberties issues or that my probing amendment would do anything other than infringe civil liberties. I merely ask the Minister—and others, perhaps—to explain the logic in not going that extra step and telling people that they must carry the card and produce it or otherwise they may be taken into custody until it is established who they are. That—I paraphrase a possible Government line—would be one way for the police to be able to pick people up, identify them and ensure that they were bona fide citizens, not terrorists. 
Conversely, if it is not compulsory to have and to carry the card, will there not be a danger of simply saying to society, ''We don't propose to pick you out in the street to see who you are.''? That is another way of saying that we could be taking steps that make it easier for the terrorist to walk the street, because he or she knows that there is nothing that the police can do if they have the card on them or not. 
On amendment No. 133 and consequential amendments, the clause ensures that the provision of public services, such as NHS treatment, cannot be conditional on evidence of registration. Similarly, clause 18 prohibits a requirement to produce identity cards. However, both clauses contain exemptions, allowing refusal of services or requiring production of a card where a person has been compelled under clause 6. One imagines that that is primarily intended to ensure that certain groups, such as foreign nationals, be required to carry a card. Those safeguards are likely to be only temporary. When the compulsory scheme is finally rolled out to every UK resident, they will no longer be relevant. 
There will be a number of consequences to the two-tier system until final national compulsion takes place. UK citizens who are compelled because they have not registered by the date on which the Home Secretary determines that the card shall become compulsory can be required to produce cards while other citizens are not. Do the Government intend to impose that two-tier system on British citizens? Probably not. Should not the Bill ensure that British citizens will not be required to produce a card, or need one to access services, until all compulsion has occurred? Otherwise, the impact will be discriminatory, as only people required to register by virtue of a factor such as their age will need to carry their cards. The amendment  would ensure that compulsion under clauses 15 and 18 did not take effect for British citizens until such time as compulsion became universal.

Patrick Mercer: We alluded to this subject earlier. My hon. Friend has made the point extremely clearly, so I will therefore be brief in saying to the Minister that I see no point in having the card if an officer of the law or an officer of the security forces cannot demand that it be produced in exactly the same way that a driving licence has to be produced.
I will be amazed, fascinated and very grateful if the Minister can explain the point of the measure to me. The card will cost the individual dear. It is designed to counter all sorts of ills, not least terrorism, yet we are saying that while there is a compulsion to own the card, there is no compulsion either to carry it or to produce it at a police station or a similar establishment. It seems to me to negate completely the point of having a card—particularly the point of compulsorily owning a card—if it cannot be demanded by an officer of the law or his equivalent.

David Curry: I seek clarification on the following point. The subsection that my hon. Friend the Member for Woking seeks to delete states:
''Nothing in this section authorises the making of regulations the effect of which would be to require an individual—
(a) to carry an ID card with him at all times''.
However, in Prime Minister's Question Time on 1 December, the Prime Minister said: 
''We think that it is legitimate and right, in this day and age, to ask people to carry identity cards, and that is why we will proceed with it.''—[Official Report, 1 December 2004, Vol. 428, c. 627.]
That is at odds with what is in the Bill. I ask the Minister to explain whom one has to take notice of. Will what the Prime Minister says be introduced later, or is he not wholly familiar with the Bill?

Des Browne: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister can speak for himself, and he often does, so there are opportunities for hon. Members to question him on such issues. I was present when he gave that answer; the Bill was already published, and the provision was in place, and the Prime Minister might have—[Interruption.] Yes, he may well have inadvertently used the same phraseology that a lot of other people use in relation to identity cards.
However, in our discussions of the Bill, we need to be far more precise, and I cannot be any more precise than I have been. I said on Second Reading and I have already said in Committee that we do not intend to require anybody to carry a card at all times, and we will not give any new powers to the police to check identity.

Patrick Mercer: What is the point, then?

Des Browne: I will come on to that in a moment. I have already tried to explain it, so it is clearly a failing on my part that hon. Members are unable to understand. I will try to explain it again, and to do so as simply as possible.
I thought I made it clear on Second Reading that if there is an argument—I do not think that there is— that we should live in a society in which people can be stopped at random and required to prove their identity, or even that they should be required to do so if some people have suspicions about them, we must have a debate on that in a context in which it is relevant to consider police powers. If we get to a position in the UK where we need to move to checking people's identities in that way—God forbid that we do—we will need to discuss whether increased police powers are justified by the environment in which we live and the problems and challenges that we face, and then we can decide whether we want to give the police those powers. 
It is clear to me that we have already made decisions about when the police should be entitled to require people to prove who they are. They do that by taking DNA samples in certain circumstances, or by taking fingerprints. Those powers are given to the police in the context of the mischiefs being legislated for and debated in this House. In developing an identity card scheme, it is inappropriate to create a series of powers that are more properly debated in the context of prevention of terrorism, and I have no intention of allowing the Bill to be used for that purpose. 
The purpose of the Bill is to provide the police with the opportunity to prove with certainty the identity of someone against the information on the register when they already have the power to do that, subject to one minor qualification: that the scenes of crime match can be compared with fingerprints in the register if there is no match from the police's national system of fingerprints. That would not be a consequence of an interaction between individuals and it certainly would not be a consequence of police powers over individuals when dealing with them. That is not that difficult to understand nor is it inappropriate. 
I do not accept that the provision will make no contribution towards the interdiction of terrorism or terrorist-related behaviour because the police cannot stop people in the street and ask them to produce their identity card and, if they do not have it with them, ask them to produce it at a police station later on. I frankly do not consider that the analogy in relation to driving licences is true. Driving licences cannot be demanded willy-nilly by the police. They can be demanded by the police only in certain circumstances under road traffic legislation. There are good reasons for that: to drive a motor vehicle, obviously a person must qualify for a driving licence and be permitted to have a driving licence. Having the driving licence is a condition precedent on whether the person is insured to drive the motor vehicle, which has significant consequences for other road users. As I said, the analogy of driving licences is not a true one. I do not accept that such action needs to be carried out to make the provision effective and I shall resist amendments that would change the Bill in such a way.

Patrick Mercer: I wish to clarify what the Minister said earlier when he referred to a change in circumstances. Let us assume that something like the Madrid bombing had occurred in this country and that the whole climate in which our police and security forces have to operate changed overnight as, indeed,  did the political climate. Does the hon. Gentleman foresee circumstances when, with the cards in place, legislation can be rushed through quickly by which they can be demanded by officers of the law?

Des Browne: One should be aware of Greeks bearing gifts. The hon. Gentleman is tempting me down a path that I do not want to go down. We are where we are. Security services have certain powers. We have debated them and, as Parliament, we are responsible for the fact that police have those powers. We have legislated for them. We have decided what sort of country we want to live in and what police powers we want. We are now giving the police the opportunity, when exercising those powers, to have access to certainty about the proof of people's identity. I am talking about identity, not police powers.
I repeat that, for good, sensible reasons, we said that, if the police have fingerprints from a scene of an existing crime but they cannot match them with their fingerprint database, they ought to have access to the biometric database and the identity register that will be available to identify who may or who may not be the perpetrator of the crime, or who was present at the scene of the crime. That seems perfectly sensible.

Mark Oaten: The Minister reassures us of his determination not to extend the powers. I note that he has said that several times. However, when powers exist under terrorism legislation for the police to stop individuals and identify them, does the hon. Gentleman consider it logical that the ID card could be a way in which to establish identity?

Des Browne: What is logical and what we are legislating for is that the police should have access to the means by which they can verify the identity of someone when they cannot do so from their databases—if they have the powers to do so, in any event, but not if they do not have such powers. I frankly do not understand the argument that the scheme is pointless unless we bring in that additional police power.
I do not want to live in a society in which the police can stop people willy-nilly and ask them to prove who they are. Such an environment will be subject to the worst part of the way in which identity card schemes have been abused in some other countries. It would drive us into relationships between individuals and the police that we have gone to significant lengths to move away from, especially in areas with a high number of ethnic minorities. We must protect ourselves from that. The scheme is not about police powers, but the standard of proof of identity. I cannot make that any clearer and I would defend the scheme against any suggestions that it should be extended beyond that. 
I will deal quickly with the other amendments. Amendment No. 133 would mean that regulations under clause 15 could not require British citizens to produce an identity card before accessing public services until universal compulsion had been introduced, even if a requirement to register were first introduced, for example, for people in a particular age group. 
The proposal in amendments Nos. 134 and 135 would mean that British citizens could not be required to produce a card or to consent to a check on the register until all British citizens were required to register. That would apply even if the conditions in clause 18(2) were met: where the requirement was imposed under clause 15, where a reasonable alternative was permitted, or where the person concerned was subject to compulsory registration under clause 6. If the proposal were accepted, it would be unlawful for anyone to require an identity card as one means of identification before offering a service to British citizens. 
There may be some circumstances in which we would wish to make regulations under clause 15 for public services that are not provided free of charge, one such example being the issue of a firearms certificate. That would affect any British citizen who applied for a certificate, as well as any non-British citizen who was in the same position, before they were required to register under clause 6. That would bring the issue of a certificate under the exemption in clause 18(2)(a) to the general principle that cards cannot be required before compulsion applies to any particular category. 
It would not be of any assistance to the Committee for me to go any further in relation to these matters, as the hon. Member for Woking has not dealt with any other issues. If he thinks that I should, he should intervene at this stage. If he thinks that I should not, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins: My right hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon has done the Committee a tremendous service this afternoon, because he has pointed out exactly what the Prime Minister's view is about this matter. We should be clear, for the record, that the amendment that I tabled requires someone to carry an identity card. The Prime Minister's view was expressed last month:
''We think that it is legitimate and right, in this day and age, to ask people to carry identity cards,''—[Official Report, 1 December; Vol. 428, c. 627.]
It is as simple as that. As far as the Minister is concerned, this is now a major issue. We appear to have a Prime Minister who takes a view—we have no evidence that he has changed it—entirely contrary to that which the Home Secretary and his Ministers take. 
I will make a serious proposition. There is time between now and Thursday for the Minister to speak to the Prime Minister and ask him whether he would kindly tell this Committee, by letter—it is quite unnecessary for it to be done in any other way—what his actual view is. Had I had the foresight of my right hon. Friend and recalled what the Prime Minister had said, I would have made an approach to him and asked him whether he would have been kind enough to sign our amendment.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: My hon. Friend highlights an important point. It would be possible for him to table a written question to the Prime Minister today with a named day—by Thursday morning. We could ask the Minister to ensure that we get an answer to such a question in time for our proceedings on Thursday.

Humfrey Malins: My hon. Friend comes up with an excellent suggestion.

John Robertson: Is what the Prime Minister said not exactly compatible with what my hon. Friend the Minister was saying? Expecting somebody to carry a card and asking him to do so does not tell him that he must do it.

Humfrey Malins: That is an interesting distinction. If the words:
''We think that it is . . . right . . . to ask people to carry identity cards''
reflect the Minister's view, I would be very interested. It is a most important point. I know the Minister has access to the Prime Minister, probably at all times. He will have the opportunity between now and Thursday to come back to us on this key point. Of course there will be many opportunities in the Chamber tomorrow for the Prime Minister to clarify his position, because I am sure that many hon. Members will be seeking to find out what it is. Many of us in the House are influenced by the Prime Minister's views, some more so than others. 
In that spirit, and certain that we shall return to the matter on Report, because I have just noticed what the Prime Minister said about the cost of the scheme—I wish I had noticed that yesterday—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 - Procedure for regulations under s. 15

David Curry: I beg to move amendment No. 188, in clause 16, page 14, line 38, at end insert—
'(1A) The power to make regulations under section 15 may not be exercised so as to create different requirements for identity checks in different parts of the United Kingdom, except insofar as this is necessary due to differences in the public services provided.'. 
I think that the Minister largely dealt with this matter, but there were some earlier discussions on whether or not the rules would be same north and south of the border. The amendment is really to tease that out. 
I hesitate to quote the Prime Minister again, although I think he might be slightly sounder on this reply than the previous one. During the opening day of the debate on the Queen's Speech, the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond), the leader of the SNP, said: 
''The Scottish Executive said this morning that identity cards would not be compulsory in Scotland for gaining access to devolved services, leading to the possibility that people will not need them to go to hospital but will need them to collect a pension. Will identity cards be compulsory in Scotland or not?''
The Prime Minister responded: 
''The devolved services are a matter for the Scottish Executive under devolution legislation, as the hon. Gentleman knows. However, it would be our intention here to ensure that when they are compulsory—obviously, that has to go through a legislative process in the House—they are essential in order to access services.''—[Official Report, 23 November 2004; Vol. 428, c. 23–24.]
I think that the Prime Minister is saying is that there will be identical requirements north and south of the border. However, I thought the Minister said that in Scotland it might be possible to require a different form of identity in order to access of services. The amendment gives the Minister a chance to clarify where we have ended up.

[Derek Conway in the Chair]

Jon Owen Jones: Further to those questions, I largely understand how the system would work, but there are a few anomalies that I would like explained.
I understand that where services are arranged, organised and paid for by the Scottish Executive or the Welsh Assembly, then they can determine the identity requirements to access those services. 
For example, if primary school services in Scotland or Wales were being accessed, Scotland or Wales would determine whether they wanted ID cards to be used or not. The same would apply if general practitioner services in either of those countries were being accessed. 
That is fair enough, because the money that pays for those services comes out of the Scottish or Welsh blocks. But what happens with a service such as housing benefit, which is administered by local authorities? Local authorities are administered by either the Scottish Executive or the Welsh Assembly, but the financing for housing benefit comes direct from the Treasury. In that case, it does not make sense that the determination of whether people have entitlement or not should be a devolved matter. 
Another example of a possible anomaly would be university education. Access to, and support for, university education is administered by local authorities, but, depending on the university attended, the funding may come from Welsh sources, the Scottish block or directly from Treasury support. I am not sure that it is as clear in that case where the control of entitlement should come from. 
This matter may also apply to hospitals. Hospital services remain fairly integrated—although they are becoming more disintegrated by the day between Scotland, Wales and England. People may access tertiary care in any of those countries regardless of which country they are from—although they are much more likely to access it in London as this is where most tertiary care occurs. Most acute care for people who live in the border regions of mid-Wales and north Wales is accessed in England. Can the Minister explain this matter? 
It is reasonable and easy to understand why there should be different arrangements for entitlement in areas where the service is supplied and administered by the Scottish or Welsh block. But there are a number of anomalies such as housing benefits, universities and access to some hospital care.

Des Browne: I welcome you, Mr. Conway, to our deliberations this afternoon.
While this matter may appear to very complicated, I hope that it can be unravelled quite simply. It is not about who funds the service, it is about where the  legislative responsibility for the service lies; whether it is reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament or devolved to one of the Assemblies in Wales or Northern Ireland or the Scottish Parliament. It is not about who pays. 
My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, Central (Mr. Jones) was right to identify housing benefit in the example that he gave, but housing benefit regulations are promulgated here by the Department for Work and Pensions on a UK-wide basis and although local authorities administer these as agents for it, any provisions would apply universally across the United Kingdom. I do not want to go into all the possibilities, but this matter should be entered on the record. Seven or eight sentences should be sufficient to do that. 
The Government have always been clear that the primary functions of the scheme—that is, establishing nationality and identity, supporting national security and helping to control immigration—are reserved issues and therefore the legislation provides for the national identity register and the issue of ID cards to apply uniformly throughout the UK. These are clearly reserved matters. 
However, it is right that the devolved Administrations decide whether the cards should be required for devolved services. It would not be right for the UK Parliament to restrict the devolved Administrations in their requirement to use cards for services for which they are responsible. 
Clause 16 would allow the Assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland to make orders under clause 15 to require the production of an ID card to access devolved services in Wales and Northern Ireland respectively. Whether or not the ID scheme or the card is to be used for proof of identity at the point of access for devolved services—however they are delivered—is a matter for the Assemblies to legislate for. 
Clause 44(2) makes it clear that this power does not extend to the Scottish Parliament. It is for the Scottish Parliament to legislate as to whether the production of an ID card or access to the register should be a condition precedent of accessing devolved services such as health or education—but not restricted to health or education in Scotland. That does not affect clause 19, which deals with the power to provide information to the police in relation to 
''the prevention or detection of crime''.
That applies to the police in Scotland and Northern Ireland in the same way as it does to the police in England and Wales. I cannot make the point any clearer than that.

Jon Owen Jones: May I persuade my hon. Friend to make the position slightly clearer? He has entirely clarified the position on housing benefit.
What about universities? Let us suppose that the Welsh Assembly decides that a person going to a Welsh university does not require ID qualification to establish whether they are a home student or not. If that person were to go to an English university, would that university require them to show whether they  were a home student in order to qualify for home support? Who would pay?

Des Browne: With respect, the problem is that I do not know enough about how English universities—or any universities—relate to the provision of public services. The answer is: where does the legislative responsibility lie for those institutions and the provision of that service? If it lies with the devolved Assemblies or the devolved Scottish Parliament, it is for them to make the decision about access. If responsibility for legislation and accountability is reserved to the UK Parliament, the UK Parliament will make the decision. My hon. Friend needs to consider the individual service that he is concerned about and ask whether it is a devolved matter.
I understand that there will be people who live on the border. There are existing arrangements allowing people to get health provision, for example, on either side of borders, but it is access to the provision that it is appropriate to consider. If the English health service is providing a contracted service to a Scottish health authority, the access comes through the Scottish health authority, which has to satisfy the English health authority that that person is entitled to the service being provided. Perhaps the Scottish authority will pay for it in any event, but it is a matter for it to decide; the issue is who has responsibility for access to the service. I cannot be any clearer than that. I have no doubt that hon. Members will think of individual sets of circumstances but, with respect, I cannot come to a Committee having covered every single set of circumstances. 
As my hon. Friend raises the issues of universities, I will research it, particularly in the context of Welsh students attending English universities, and I will give him a specific answer.

David Curry: Welcome back, as it were, Mr. Conway.
I suspect that the matter before us is rather like learning to ride a bike with two wheels; when one can do it, nothing seems more idiotically simple, but before one can do it, nothing seems more utterly impossible. I want to make sure that I understand what the Minister said. He seemed to say that it is up to the devolved Parliament or Assemblies to determine whether they will require an ID card for access to public services, even though clause 1(4)(e) states that one of the purposes of the whole process that we are debating is 
''the efficient and effective provision of public services.''
The implication from our debates is that, in England, the card will be required in order to access a whole range of public services, and we had a little debate a while ago about the discretionary elements of the scheme. So it seems that there could well be a discrepancy in what one is required to produce to gain access to services in different parts of the United Kingdom. I think that I have understood that right. We need to reflect a little on the implications of what the Minister has said. In order to keep our powder dry, and in case we are required to return to the whole issue later, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 - Power to provide for checks on the Register

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Richard Allan: I apologise to the Committee for having had to miss what I understand was a quite interesting sitting earlier today. In returning to the Committee, it is worth spending a brief moment on the clause. I know that we are trying to make progress, but I want to understand a critical point about the data that are to be held in the national identity register.
Clause 17 would allow the Secretary of State to restrict how the data held in the national identity register could be used by Departments or agencies that perform identity checks under the clause 15 powers. That raises important issues about who the data controller—to use data protection speak—for the national identity register will be. Is it the correct reading of clause 17 that a Department or agency will be able to ask for the ability to perform checks against the national identity register? 
I assume that the Secretary of State is the Home Secretary, although it would be helpful to understand whether we are talking about a single Secretary of State or about generic powers for any Secretary of State. Under clause 17, will it be possible to say, ''I do not believe that the procedures in place in your Department or agency are sufficient to allow you to carry out the identity-check functions.''? According to the specific provisions of the clause, it seems that the Secretary of State may say, ''You can perform those checks only if you register and use this prescribed equipment as well as those prescribed procedures.'' 
It would be helpful to understand the relationship between the agencies—which, in modern government, can be remote from accountability—and the Secretary of State, who will control the national identity register and should be rigorously accountable to the public for the use and potential abuse of their data.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I want to ask the Minister about one brief point, which seems important. A lot of the scheme is predicated on the basis that certain prescribed people will have access to the readers. Therefore, the readers will be very important, and some at a higher level will have access to more information than others. Will he consider carefully what would happen if a reader were stolen? Will he try to ensure that the technology is such that a reader can be disabled if it is stolen?

Des Browne: The readers will have to be able to be disabled or, alternatively, the system will need to be able to deny access to any readers that are stolen or reported stolen. The hon. Gentleman is exactly right.
The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan) seeks reassurances, which I will try to give him in short order. If they are not sufficient, he will no doubt let us know. Clause 17 will enable checks to be made of information recorded in the register by people providing public services to verify a person's identity. We have already discussed that in some detail. The  clause is necessary to ensure that individuals and public services may use the register to assert identity and entitlement to public services. Specifically, the clause will give the Secretary of State the power to regulate identity checks. 
The hon. Gentleman asked whether the clause refers to a Secretary of State as that term is normally meant in legislation or to the Home Secretary. It refers to the former. Secretaries of State are interchangeable in our constitution. The clause refers to any Secretary of State, because any Secretary of State can perform the function of any other Secretary of State. However, the Secretary of State will be performing functions in relation to home affairs, so it is almost certain that the Secretary of State in question will be the Home Secretary. 
Clause 17 will give the Secretary of State the power to regulate identity checks, including how applications for provision of information are to be made. He may regulate for an accreditation scheme for user organisations. That answers the hon. Gentleman's fundamental point. The Secretary of State may regulate for the equipment that such organisations use to ensure that it meets the highest standards and the requirements that mean that access to the scheme via stolen machines can be disabled. All those provisions are to safeguard people's information. 
In addition, under subsection (5), steps have to be taken to ensure that a member of the public likely to be affected is informed of and consulted on the proposals for the regulations. I do not think that we can make this part of the scheme any more appropriate in terms of access. It will give all the opportunities that the hon. Gentleman seeks to ensure that the data are protected and that the Secretary of State, who has responsibility for protecting that data, regulates access to them so that they are protected. 
I trust that the hon. Gentleman is satisfied with that answer and that we can move on from clause 17. 
Question put and agreed to. 
Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Richard Allan: On a point of order, Mr. Conway. The amendment paper lists a new amendment on clause 18.

Des Browne: It was not moved.

Clause 19 - Use for purposes of public authorities etc.

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 173, in clause 19, page 17, line 15, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert—
'(2) The provision of information is authorised in this section where it is— 
(a) the provision of information to— 
(i) the Director-General of the Security Service, 
(ii) the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, 
(iii) the Director of the Government Communications Headquarters, 
(iv) the Director-General of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, or 
(v) a chief officer of police; and 
(b) it is— 
(i) in the interests of national security, or 
(ii) for the purposes connected with the prevention or detection of crime.'.

Derek Conway: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 174, in clause 19, page 17, line 17, leave out 'connected with' and insert 'necessary for'.
No. 136, in clause 19, page 17, line 27, at end insert 
'for any of the purposes specified in subsection (2A)'. 
No. 137, in clause 19, page 17, line 27, at end insert— 
'(2A) The purposes specified in this subsection are— 
(a) in the interests of national security; 
(b) for purposes connected with the prevention or detection of crime; or 
(c) for other purposes specified by order made by the Secretary of State.'. 
No. 53, in clause 19, page 17, line 32, leave out 
'prevention or detection of crime' 
and insert 
'detection of serious crime which shall mean any crime giving rise to an offence triable only on indictment'. 
No. 175, in clause 19, page 17, line 32, after 'of', insert 'serious'. 
No. 54, in clause 19, page 17, line 32, leave out from 'crime' to end of line 33.

Richard Allan: We tabled the amendment to tease out how the information held in the national identity register will be used, in particular by law enforcement organisations. We want to redraft the terms under which the information will be used in response to a concern that has been expressed not only by us, but by other organisations such as Justice, Liberty and the Law Society, about the breadth of the powers set out in the clause. We suggest to the Government an alternative that would more specifically focus the powers. We also want more clarity about their precise intention in advancing the existing wording.
Amendment No. 173 sets out the framework for the alternative wording and amendment No. 174 would strengthen one aspect of it. We want to introduce the concept of necessity and have said throughout Committee proceedings that a potential breach of privacy is acceptable where it is both proportionate and necessary. We always wish to see that enshrined in legislation. 
We suggest an alternative wording, which says that the information should be necessary for carrying out the functions of the Security Service, rather than simply ''connected with'' them. The amendment tests the existing wording and I seek assurance from the Minister that the normal tests of necessity and proportionality apply, even though the wording seems to be a much vaguer form of ''connected with''. 
Amendment No. 175 returns to a theme from the beginning of proceedings on the Bill—that was not very long ago, although it may seem like it—when we sought to establish what level of crime might justify  the use of the national identity register. We debated whether the Bill should refer to crime or serious crime. The amendment would introduce the notion of seriousness. 
It is important that we are able to test where the use of the data may occur. I have referred to that previously and it echoes a debate about what happens with data that people create by using the internet, where they are concerned about a potential breach of their privacy. We had a big debate on that and the previous Home Secretary unusually changed position from the beginning to the end as the public realised that the law enforcement agencies wanted a much broader range of access to a much greater range of personal data than they felt comfortable with. 
I accept that the public want to be protected from criminals, terrorists and so on, but at the same time they want some privacy. We are trying all the time to test where that balance should lie. The amendment has been tabled to draw out the Minister's understanding of how he will apply that test under the clause. It also reflects our concern that the necessity and proportionality tests should be rigorous and an issue of principle in defending the article 8 right to privacy. 
I hope that the Minister and other Members can tease out some of those concerns in this short debate. Other amendments address specific aspects of the data in relation to matters that are also serious—they involve fraud and the Inland Revenue—but which are in a different category from those we are debating in this group, which deals with those agencies that investigate crime and carry out intelligence and secret service functions.

Humfrey Malins: This is a big debate and the Minister has a lengthy reply to make to the points raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam.
My amendments reflect concerns expressed in the House and outside about the nature of the information that can be provided to a wide variety of bodies, as set out in the clause. The issue of supplying information about me, without my knowledge, to various bodies is sensitive. Although it is entirely proper that information should be supplied, one of my amendments would limit that to the purposes of security and serious crime. 
I am concerned about the wide-ranging powers, particularly under clause 19(4), where not only the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ or the Serious Organised Crime Agency are being brought in; we are also bringing in the tax and customs people, who seem to have some very wide powers. 
When I link that in with the debate that we could be having now with regard to paragraph 9 of schedule 1, to which I invite my hon. Friends to direct their attention, I become concerned. That paragraph, which is right at the end of the Bill, is potentially very worrying: 
''The following may be recorded in the entry in the Register for an individual''.
It goes on to list what amounts to a complete audit trail, which is 
''(a) particulars of every occasion on which information contained in the individual's entry has been provided''— 
that is very wide-ranging—and 
''(b) particulars of every person to whom such information has been provided on such an occasion;
(c) other particulars, in relation to each such occasion, of the provision of the information.''
It does not say what those ''other particulars'' are. 
We are debating a serious matter and the Minister has a lengthy reply to make.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: My hon. Friend draws the Committee's attention to paragraph 9 of schedule 1. Before he concludes, I hope that he will also refer to clauses 20 and 21. We do not want to pre-empt the debate on those clauses, but they contain serious measures that will give the Secretary of State or a prescribed person powers to provide information to other people without an individual's consent. Therefore, this is becoming a very powerful provision for the state. I think it should be very carefully considered.

Humfrey Malins: My hon. Friend is entirely right to draw those clauses to our attention. We are getting into a position where a serous and major power is being given to the state.
I do not wish to speak at length to amendments Nos. 136, 137, 53 and 54; they are on the amendment paper and the Minister will have prepared a response to them. I know that he has much to tell us, hence the brevity of my contribution. If he has a response to those amendments, I would prefer him to reply at this stage, despite the fact that I have not spoken to them at length. 
Furthermore, subject to progress, it is my intention not to move amendments Nos. 60 and 61 and probably not to speak to amendments Nos. 55 to 50. The Minister is aware of my worries and the issue is big enough for him to realise that we will return to it on Report. I shall bring my remarks to a close.

Des Browne: I am grateful to the hon. Members for Sheffield, Hallam and for Woking for they way in which they have introduced such important issues. I propose to reply to the debate along the lines of the Government's response to the individual amendments. As the hon. Member for Cotswold said perceptively, the clause is related to other clauses and, Mr. Conway, you may allow members of the Committee to treat the debate that deals with such issues as preceding a number of clauses. That will allow them, when they have considered what I have to say, to come back with other issues if they want further information.
It is a disadvantage that we have reached such an important stage when we have been engaged in other matters for most of today, as that will have an effect on our ability to function at the appropriate level for such a serious matter. I shall do what I am disinclined to do, which is to concentrate on the notes that I have prepared, rather than take interventions and develop the debate as we go along. We may have an opportunity to do so later when we reach clauses 20  and 21, if necessary, or on Report. It is an important matter and some significant issues will be raised. 
The starting point is that information held on the national identity register will be confidential, but there need to be exceptions to that principle to realise the most beneficial aspects of an identity card scheme. We have debated at some length the utility of the scheme in relation to serious crime, terrorist offences—which are, of course, serious crimes—and other areas of national security. There needs to be, by definition, some exception to the principle of confidentiality to achieve the best from the scheme for those purposes. 
The following amendments are all related to the provisions under clause 19 and those clauses that cover the circumstances in which information may be provided without the consent of the individual. Amendment No. 173 would limit the provision of information without consent to the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ, the Serious Organised Crime Agency, the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad. That is in advance of the creation of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency, which will be amalgamation of those two other agencies and the police. The amendment would limit the clause to circumstances in which the provision of that information is in the interests of national security or the prevention and detection of crime. 
The effect of the amendment would be to narrow the grounds for which one of the intelligence services, by which I mean the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ, SOCA or the police could have information provided to it. I understand the desire to ensure that information can be provided from the register without consent only in limited circumstances. I agree that national security and the prevention and detection of crime are legitimate reasons for providing information without consent and will no doubt be the grounds on which most requests for information to be provided from the register are sought. However, it is not wise to limit the information that can be provided to those agencies for just those two purposes. 
Subsection (2), as drafted, limits the information that can be provided to those agencies, with the exception of the police who are dealt with under subsection (3)—with which I will deal in a moment—to purposes connected with the carrying out of that service's functions. For example, information could be provided only to the Security Service for purposes connected with the protection of national security, the support of law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime and to safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. 
Those are the functions of the Security Service as set out in the Security Service Act 1989, which it is presumed this Parliament is content with. The service already enjoys those functions and they have been legislated for by Parliament. 
The existing limitation to the purposes of each organisation is intended to ensure that information is disclosed only to bodies with a legitimate public interest in having it. All the bodies listed in  subsection (2) have clear statutory purposes. They have been scrutinised and approved by Parliament. We have agreed that they are their functions and that they are what we want them to do. Why should we limit the purposes for which they can receive information to only some of their functions? That is not sensible or consistent. In a sense, to reflect the argument that we had about carrying and police powers, if we want to limit the functions of those organisations, we ought to do it in the context of the legislation that gives them their functions and not in the context of this legislation. 
Rather than limit the purposes for which the bodies can receive information, we must ensure that information provided to the agencies is properly authorised and that there is independent oversight. The Bill provides for that and I will discuss the issue further in relation to later clauses. We can come back to the issue if we so need. 
The Bill treats the police in a different way to the agencies that I mentioned. Subsection(3) would permit information to be provided to a chief officer of police where the information is in the interests of national security, the prevention and detection of crime or for other purposes specified by order. 
We have taken that approach as the police have common law as well as statutory powers and do not have a set of statutory purposes. As similar approach has been used in other legislation, for example, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. 
Amendment Nos. 173 and 54 would also remove the ability to specify in an order additional purposes for which the police could have information provided to them. 
It is widely known that the police get involved in other areas of work that would not be classified as preventing or detecting crime, or protecting national security, but are probably seen more as providing a service to the general public. Such examples would be identifying a body that has not died in suspicious circumstances, or tracing a missing, vulnerable person who might be in danger because of a medical condition. People in this country might well consider those situations to be good enough reason to allow information to be provided from the register without consent. Indeed, some would think it strange if we had the tools to do that, but were prevented from so doing by the inflexibility of our legislation. 
Clearly, we need to give this matter careful thought. Providing information without consent requires the careful balancing of rights. However, as a principle, it is not right to limit the usefulness of the register when Parliament might consider there to be good reasons to depart from the principle of non-provision. It is right that we give ourselves the flexibility to approve those situations in future, should we so desire. Any regulations would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny under the negative resolution procedure. For that reason, I would not accept amendments Nos. 54 and 173. 
While I am on the subject of the police, it would perhaps be useful to discuss amendments Nos. 175 and 53. Amendment 175 would permit information to be provided to the police only for purposes connected to a serious crime. Amendment No. 53 would restrict the provision of information to the police to the detection only of a serious crime and would insert a new definition of serious offence, which would be an offence ''triable only on indictment''. 
The effect of amendment No. 175 would be to limit the usefulness of the national identity register and the ID cards, as it would mean that the police could not seek even basic information from the register for any person arrested for a non-indictable offence if they did not consent. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam will recollect that he did not pursue his similar amendment to clause 1. I will not repeat the arguments that he found so persuasive last week. 
The fact is that the law already allows the police to take fingerprints and DNA samples from someone who has been arrested for a recordable offence, in order to identify them. It would be odd if, in order to seek the provision of basic identity information from the national identity register, the police were to have their hands tied by being able to make checks only on those suspected of offences triable on indictment. 
Amendment No. 53 would also seriously constrain the legitimate use of the national identity register and the ID cards scheme for policing purposes, if prevention of crime were excluded from the purposes for which information from the register could be provided to the police. A large proportion of police time is taken up with crime prevention, as opposed to detection. Prevention includes much general police work, including vehicle or pedestrian stops as well as targeting more serious criminal suspects such as drug traffickers or terrorist suspects. It is right that our police force is not merely reactive. 
The phrase ''prevention and detection'' of crime is commonplace in legislation such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Indeed, even the European convention on human rights allows interference with the right to private life, which comes under article 8, on the ground of—guess what—prevention of crime. Are we seriously suggesting that we must wait until a crime is committed before the police can act? I do not think so. 
Amendment No. 174 would restrict the provision of information to the intelligence services to purposes ''necessary for'', rather than ''connected with'', their functions, as is allowed under the Bill. It is of course important that the information provided to those agencies is proportionate to the reason for which the information is being requested, but the amendment is unnecessary. Largely, information that is ''connected with'' those functions will be the same as information that is ''necessary for'' those functions. However, ''connected with'' ensures that we do not unwittingly tie the hands of those operating in the agencies. 
Proportionality is, in my view, better assessed by those operating in that arena. That is supplemented, of course, by ensuring that the relevant commissioner— either the intelligence services commissioner in the case of the intelligence services, or the national identity scheme commissioner in the case of all other bodies that may be authorised to receive information without consent—can review the situations in which information has been provided, and they will be able to do that. Oversight and a power to make regulations regarding authorisation procedures is set out in detail in subsequent clauses. For that reason I would reject amendment No. 174. 
Amendments Nos. 136 and 137 would restrict the information that could be provided to the Serious Organised Crime Agency—or, in advance of its creation, its constituent agencies—so that it was provided only in circumstances in which its functions related to national security or the prevention or detection of serious crime, or for other purposes specified by order. The amendment would mean treating SOCA as any other police force. As I said before, where Parliament has approved the functions of an agency—where we have agreed on what we want it to do—we need to give it the tools to do the job. Our role is to ensure that the tools are used appropriately. The police do not have statutory purposes, so it is for us to say for what purposes information should be provided to them. That is not the case for SOCA, and I therefore reject amendments Nos. 136 and 137. 
I know that the subject is, understandably, of great interest to many hon. Members, and not just those on the Committee. I hope that the Committee will be reassured that the amendments are unnecessary and undesirable. I think that I have set out the Government's position as best I could, and I think that it has a persuasive logic to it. I therefore invite hon. Members not to press the amendments, but I recognise that they will want to ruminate on what I have said, and may well come back with more searching questions on other clauses in this part of the Bill.

Derek Conway: Before I call the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam, let me say that I have taken notice of what the Minister and Front Benchers said. Although there can be no question of going back to debate a clause that has already been approved, I am sure that we will take the mood of the Committee into account on Thursday morning when we deal with the clause, and I will not be too restrictive about the debate.

Richard Allan: I am grateful for that guidance, Mr. Conway. I look forward to a bit of rumination over the Minister's comprehensive response. On that basis, it would make sense at this stage to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 176, in clause 19, page 17, line 37, leave out paragraphs (a) to (f) and insert
'where it is necessary in the interests of national security or the prevention or detection of serious crime'.

Derek Conway: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 55, in clause 19, page 17, line 39, leave out 'prevention or'. 
No. 56, in clause 19, page 17, line 40, leave out paragraph (c). 
No. 57, in clause 19, page 17, line 43, leave out paragraph (d). 
No. 58, in clause 19, page 18, line 1, leave out paragraph (e). 
No. 59, in clause 19, page 18, line 3, leave out from 'numbers' to end of line 4.

Richard Allan: I recognise that I have come in for the night shift, and that others have been here a lot longer and are seeking to go, so I shall not prolong debate on amendment No. 176. I simply want to put on record our concerns about the powers of the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise.
Following your guidance, Mr. Conway, that we are likely to have a broader debate on later clauses, which will govern the rules under which Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue will have to operate under the current clause, perhaps we do not need to have a full debate at this stage. However, I want to ensure that we put on the record our concerns about the breadth of these powers, which I recognise exclude the auditing data under schedule 1, but still include quite a large amount of data. The clause seems to offer the Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue broader scope for accessing that data than is strictly necessary, hence the terms of amendment No. 176.

Des Browne: The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam has introduced the amendment quickly. I would be testing the patience of the Committee were I to repeat the arguments that I have already laid out in some detail in relation to the last group of amendments, which are directly transposable to this group. Her Majesty's Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue enjoy different powers and there are different, although good, reasons why it is appropriate that they should have access to this information for their investigatory purposes.
I rest my case on the arguments that I have already made. It is not for me to say whether we can return to this debate in more detail at another stage; that is a matter for the Chair. I resist the amendment for many of the same reasons that I resisted the last group. Because of the role I play I will, no doubt, find many opportunities to go into detail on these issues, should it be necessary. If the hon. Gentleman is satisfied with that approach and can be persuaded to withdraw his amendment, I am sure that we will return to the matters in hand in more detail and he may get more detailed information from me. At this stage I will see how the Committee responds.

Richard Allan: We are offered a further opportunity for rumination. At this stage, it makes sense for me to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Des Browne: I beg to move amendment No. 153, in clause 19, page 18, line 26, after 'Police;' insert—
'( ) the chief officer of the States of Jersey Police Force; 
( ) the chief officer of the salaried police force of the Island of Guernsey;'. 
This is slightly unusual because it is the first Government amendment. It would give effect to the request of the authorities in Jersey and Guernsey that their chief officers of police be added to the list of chief officers in clause 19(7). The chief constable of the Isle of Man constabulary is already included in that clause and the amendment aligns the other Crown dependencies with it. This technical amendment changes nothing in the provisions of clause 19 and is a logical addition to the list of chief police officers.

Humfrey Malins: Does Jersey and Guernsey include Alderney, where I have had some wonderful holidays over the years, about which I would be pleased to tell the Committee in due course?

Des Browne: The hon. Gentleman has caught me out—not for the first time—with a question to which I do not know the answer, but I will find out. I normally pride myself on my knowledge of the geography of the United Kingdom, but I do not know precisely the answer and rather than guess I shall provide the hon. Gentleman with that information.
Amendment agreed to. 
Clause 19, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Further consideration adjourned.—[Joan Ryan.] 
Adjourned accordingly at four minutes past Six o'clock till Thursday 27 January at ten minutes past Nine o'clock.